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ABSTRACT

This document, a curriculum guide, grew out of a symposium on the role of secrecy in U.S. foreign policy. The curriculum examines ways in which citizens get information about the government and how government secrecy influences that information. Students analyze covert U.S. involvement in such places as Iran, Guatemala, and Cuba, and consider the ramifications of the secret methods the government has used to further U.S. goals. Following an introduction, the guide offers units on: (1) "Getting Started"; (2) "Rights and Responsibilities"; (3) "Secrecy and Covert Action in Recent Years"; (4) "The Growth of the National Security State"; (5) "Interference with Foreign Governments"; (6) "Secrecy and National Security"; (7) "Checks and Balances"; and (8) "The Limits of Covert Action." The document also includes a timeline, an indication of suggested grade levels for readings, a glossary, and a bibliography. Many of the individual readings present portions of primary source materials for student consideration. Contains 57 references. (SG)

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Heather Barry, a student in the class, served as chief researcher and content consultant for this project. Her assistance, advice, and good humor were invaluable.

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FOREWORD

[redacted]

ESR is a professional association of educators who are creating new ways to teach for active and responsible participation in the world. ESR is a national, nonprofit organization.

[redacted]

ESR teachers undertake activities to link students with the rapidly changing, closely interconnected world of the 21st century and help them learn how to become caring and effective citizens.

ESR's goals are:

- to work with other teachers to design stimulating and supportive environments for advancing professional expertise;
- to help students develop into critical thinkers and decision-makers who feel personally responsible to their communities and the world.

[redacted]

ESR creates professional development opportunities across the country.
ESR members develop leadership skills as they link their expertise with others to offer in-service programs, workshops, conferences, and intensive institutes. Thousands of educators credit ESR's professional development programs for enriching their teaching lives — in their classrooms, in the quality of their professional relationships, and in the network of supportive colleagues they've found through ESR.

ESR publishes and distributes diverse educational materials.
ESR materials are created by writers and educators who collaborate in unique ways to shape the pedagogy of teaching for social responsibility. Methodologies, curriculum ideas, and classroom reflections are published in pamphlets, journals, and full-length curricula. ESR also distributes outstanding materials published by others.

ESR encourages educators to join in school-based programs that spark greater teacher participation in local decisions.
While teaching their students to build skills for social responsibility, educators can help create a more democratic model in their professional communities. ESR encourages schools to support classroom teachers' curriculum initiatives, substantive interaction with other educators, and opportunities for professional development.

[redacted]

ESR helps students engage in their world by teaching them to think and learn in a classroom environment that models a productive community. ESR pedagogy evolves from such principles as:

- **democratic classrooms** that encourage student decision-making and active, participatory learning;
- teaching about controversial issues from **multiple perspectives** in ways that depolarize conflict and deepen understanding;
- **examining and questioning** one's own and others' assumptions, biases, perceptions, and sources of information;
- teaching **critical thinking** by embracing complexity and learning from belief as well as doubt;
- guiding students toward **informed decision-making, creative problem-solving,** and **community service**.

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Introduction

In December 1989, the United States invaded Panama and removed General Manuel Antonio Noriega from power. Months earlier, Noriega had almost been overthrown in an attempted coup directed by members of the Panamanian army. The General survived this attempt to oust him. The United States played a role in that failure.

In two columns of bold print, in the space reserved for the leading story of the day, the October 4, 1989, *New York Times* reported:

NORIEGA TRIUMPHS OVER ARMY REBELS,
U.S. KNEW OF PLOT

The sub-headline, in less bold print, stated:

BUSH DENIES ROLE

And the third headline read:

AMERICAN TROOPS ALERTED —
FAILED COUP SETS BACK OUSTER EFFORT

The story began:

> *Dissident Panamanian officers tried to overthrow Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega today but failed when troops loyal to the Panamanian leader recaptured a central military headquarters the rebels had seized.*
>
> *In a day of heavy fighting in the Panamanian capital, the rebels also managed to seize control of the national radio and television briefly, but did not expand their control much beyond the national military headquarters, according to officials here and reports from Panama City.*
>
> *After a day of rumors and reports that General Noriega had been deposed, wounded and captured, the military strongman appeared on television at the end of the day and said the coup had been crushed. He added, "The incident this morning corresponds to the permanent aggression and penetration by the forces of the United States against the tranquility of our country."*

1

Noriega had survived, the U.S. had known about the effort; the U.S. had not played a role. That's what the American public knew on October 4.

On the following day, the story from Panama was no longer in the forefront. While it still made the front-page of the *New York Times*, the story stood off to the side, and the print was far less eye-catching. The story line was:

U.S. CONSIDERED AID TO PANAMA REBELS

A single sub-headline summarized the report:

BUT BAKER AND OTHER OFFICIALS SAY THE TIME WASN'T RIPE

The report began:

> *The White House considered military support for the Panamanian uprising but ruled it out because it was uneasy with the rebel leadership, fearful of a trap and uncertain whether Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega had been captured, Administration officials said today.*
>
> *The major issue, a senior official said, was whether the rebels could accomplish the primary American goal of getting General Noriega out of Panama.*
>
> *"The worst thing would have been to send American troops in there, have them get into a fight, and have troops killed for no purpose at all," the official said.*

It became clear that there had been an American role in the events. That role had been taken secretly.

The information about Panama was quite different on the following day. Returned to leading-story status and bold print, the news from Washington had changed:

BUSH AIDES ADMIT A US ROLE IN COUP AND BAD HANDLING

Stephen Engelberg's report from Washington began:

> *Senior Administration officials said today that the American military had played a greater role in the Panamanian uprising than it had previously acknowledged.*
>
> *White House officials also said the Bush Administration's team performed badly in a major test, noting that the top foreign policy and military officials were never called together to discuss the attempted coup against Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega, the Panamanian leader. John H. Sununu, the White House chief of staff, ordered a study of how the Panama coup was handled.*
>
> *Moreover, there was continued criticism on Capitol Hill of the Administration's decision not to help the rebels more. This led to mutual recriminations between the Administration and such members of Congress as Senator Jesse Helms, Republican of North Carolina.*

Over three days, therefore, the role of the United States in the coup attempt against General Noriega had been portrayed quite differently. As reporters

investigated what happened in Panama, it became clear that there had been an American role in the events. That role had been taken secretly. It was yet another example of the United States acting covertly.

For the next two weeks a debate raged over whether intervention would have succeeded in Panama. The Boston *Globe* reported on October 15, 1989, that events in Panama were causing the Bush Administration to reassess its capability for covert action. In the lead story for its Sunday edition, the newspaper boldly stated:

US IS SAID TO WEIGH SHIFT IN COUP RULES

The sub-headline was more specific:

ASSASSINATION BAN MAY BE EASED

The story detailed the sort of covert action that could be taken legally by an American government:

> *The Bush White House has begun discussions with Senate leaders on amending the executive order that prohibits US assassinations of foreign officials to allow the United States to expand its assistance of future coup attempts, according to congressional sources.*
>
> *In the wake of the failed coup Oct. 3 in Panama, the sources said, US intelligence and military officials have complained that US officers in Panama were reluctant to promise assistance to the Panamanian rebels.*
>
> *This, the sources said, was because the US officers feared that they might be implicated if the coup resulted in the killing of Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega.*
>
> *The commanders' concern, the sources said, was that they would be unable to justify their actions as a protection of American lives or interests and would therefore be without defense if implicated in an assassination of Noriega.*
>
> *For 15 years, US policy in foreign intervention has been guided by the executive order prohibiting assassinations of foreign leaders whose policies or practices are opposed by the United States.*

How much did the American people have a right to know about our actions in Panama?

This Panama coup attempt does not appear to be one in which the US had the primary role of instigator or organizer. It does, however, focus our attention on the concept of covert action. Covert action — secret undertakings carried out to further national aims — raises constitutional, political, legal, and moral issues. The Panama incident suggests many of them. The question of secrecy is also a question about the role it plays in our relationship with the rest of the world.

Since Noriega had often acted in ways disapproved of by the American government, should the United States have worked to remove him from office? How much intervention was permissible? How much did the American people have a right to know about our actions in Panama?

In the midst of our nation's most devasting conflict, the Civil War, President Lincoln remembered the highest ideals and goals of the Founding Fathers when he spoke of a government "of the people, by the people, and for the people." Since that address one hundred and twenty-five years ago, Lincoln's eloquent phrase has become synonomous with democracy. But maintaining and protecting a democracy has never been easy. The Founding Fathers struggled with the issue. What kind of a state should they create? How would it work? Would power be centralized or decentralized? Would powers be shared or blended? Would there be one branch of government or more? Those matters were not easily resolved. From the Treaty of Paris in 1783 until the inauguration of George Washington in 1789, the young republic experimented with systems which would meet its needs. When the Articles of Confederation failed to provide the right balance, the Constitution was drafted, argued over, and finally ratified. One chief ingredient of the government which emerged was the system of checks and balances. The central government was divided into an executive, legislative, and a judicial branch, with these parts of the government fashioned so that no one branch was dominant. Each part had the ability to (at least temporarily) check an opposing segment of the government. For example, while the President could veto a bill, the Congress could override that veto.

Is covert action constitutional? Does it violate our system of checks and balances?

Each branch jealously guarded its enumerated powers. But in different periods of our history, different branches gained the upper hand. The fact that Henry Clay, Daniel Webster, and John C. Calhoun, senators from the ante-bellum period, are widely remembered while Zachary Taylor, Millard Fillmore, and Franklin Pierce, the contemporaneous presidents, are not, is an indication of the legislative superiority of that era. To cite another example, the decisions of the Supreme Court in the 1890's probably had a far greater impact on subsequent American history than any decisions made by that era's presidents, Benjamin Harrison or Grover Cleveland.

Scholars who have examined recent American history generally agree that the executive branch has become the most powerful branch of the government. Articles and books discussing the "imperial presidency" have been legion; many point out that our world is far different than the one to which the Founding Fathers, or even Lincoln, responded. New situations seem to have altered the way our government functions. This century has unveiled powers unimagined in previous eras. The scientific and technological advances have brought with them implements of destruction which have dramatically altered relations between nations. Security for countries and for individuals have seemed more tenuous, and attempts to reach that goal more desperate. In a world of nuclear weapons, the President has become the chief director of foreign policy. Yet, the Constitution gave Congress, and only Congress, the power to declare war. Should Congress preserve that right? Has modern technological society made declarations of war outdated?

Since 1945 the executive branch of government has expanded its capacity

to intervene in foreign affairs. Largely under the auspices of the CIA, the United States has the ability to work covertly overseas. Executive Order 12333 issued by President Reagan in 1981 referred to covert action as "special activities," "activities conducted in support of national foreign policy objectives abroad which are planned and executed so that the role of the United States government is not apparent or acknowledged publicly." Many political theorists believe that these secret undertakings challenge the distribution of responsibilities as outlined in the Constitution, and pose a major problem for American democracy.

On the one hand, we have our ideal of democracy — rule by the people. An executive, two houses of Congress, and representative state and local governments are all elected by popular vote. At the same time, the United States finds itself in a world full of colliding national interests, of complicated crises and tensions difficult for the public to understand. How should a government "of the people" cope with such complicated situations? Is covert action a useful tool in such a world? Who should control covert actions? Who should be told? What role should the public take?

Is covert action constitutional? Does it violate our system of checks and balances? Does it destroy our position of moral leadership in the world? Does it threaten democracy?

These are among the questions raised in this curriculum. We will look at the ways in which covert action has been used throughout the history of the United States, emphasizing the period since World War II. This curriculum will challenge students to look at our existing government and to compare it with the structure outlined in the Constitution.

This curriculum will also explore ways in which we get our information about the government, and it will examine far-reaching questions about the nature of secrecy, democracy, and power. Several different historical episodes will be presented — after an examination of the recent events of Iran-Contra, the guide will discuss the origins of covert action after WWII, involvements in the 1950s and 1960s in Iran, Guatemala, and Cuba, and covert actions during the Nixon and Reagan eras. Students will gain an understanding of the important role covert action has played in American foreign policy since World War II, and students will be challenged to think about the ramifications of the secret methods often used to carry out the national interest.

The materials in this guide can be used in a variety of classroom settings. Although the material is aimed at more advanced high school students, teachers will find some of the material useful for introductory level high school courses. In addition, some of the exercises and readings are complicated enough to be of interest to college-level students. To aid the teacher, the age-appropriateness of each reading is provided.

Although this guide is organized to be a single course in secrecy and democracy, it is recognized that most teachers will not have the luxury of teaching such a course, but will instead choose to infuse this material into existing courses.

The material contained in this guide will be useful in courses on American history, American government, political science, current events, and current issues. The material could be rearranged and fit into the standard chronological survey course, or sections of the guide could be used to introduce the specific issues raised by secrecy in a democracy. The book is designed to facilitate photo-copying and rearrangement of its parts.

The issues raised in this guide are complex ones, and this complexity should be sustained in the classroom. Secret government action should not be condemned simplistically, but neither should it be accepted as an inevitable consequence of the exercise of power. This guide intends to complicate the thinking of students: first, by seeing secret actions within their historical moment, second, by placing covert action within the context of the ongoing struggle between the various branches of American government. The guide strives for a balanced treatment of its subject, and encourages the teacher to strive for the same within the classroom.

The study of secrecy within a democracy raises several difficulties for students. Because such actions are secret, it is often difficult to gain sufficient information to study them. Students will naturally suspect the information that is available about these actions; it is the task of the teacher to move students from suspicion to a healthy skepticism, helping them analyze information in more sophisticated ways, and, therefore, gain an understanding of the limits of their analyses. Lack of information, and the complexity of both analysis and the subject itself, may frustrate students. Although the study encouraged by this guide is greatly needed for more enlightened democratic participation, the study of governmental secrecy can also make one feel *dis*-engaged. After all, how can one *participate* in government if decision-making is kept secret? The teacher will probably not be able to surmount this contradiction completely. The teacher can best stress the investigation of the subject itself as a form of participation. After all, the act of keeping informed, of keeping an eye on the government, has been a key component in our history since the colonial era. The framers of the Constitution themselves were suspicious of governments. The checks and balances and the Bill of Rights exist to prevent the government from becoming too powerful — they were born from a suspicion of power. It is this quintessentially American suspicion that must be communicated to students.

1

Getting Started

KEEPING SECRETS

Institutions are composed of people. While that is no great revelation, we often forget this when we look at large entities like the federal government. But we should remember that behind policies are specific individuals. Personal motivations and characteristics sometimes play an important role in political events.

In this activity, you should ask students to explore the personal dimensions of secrecy, concentrating on their relationships with friends and family. Ask students if they themselves keep secrets. What kinds of secrets? For what reasons? Do secrets seem like a normal part of an average day? Do students tell one thing to one set of friends and another thing to others? Do they sometimes lie in order to keep a secret? Are there different kinds of lies? Are some lies less harmful than others?

Ask students to think of a particular situation in which they knowingly told a lie (perhaps to parents — or to their teachers! — or to a boy/girl friend). Why did they lie? Were they trying to avoid something? What? Discuss with students the differences and consequences of manipulating a situation, or confronting a situation head-on.

Ask students to spend the rest of the day observing what they do and say in regard to secrecy and truth. Did they always tell "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?"

Stress to students that you do not wish to pry into their lives, but that you wish to compare personal secrecy with government secrecy. Do students expect the government to keep secrets from them? Do they *want* the government to keep secrets from them? If so, what kinds of secrets? If not, why not?

Point out to students that it is important that they think about how they would like the government to act before beginning this study of what the government has done. Emphasize that the question of whether the United States government should have a secret foreign policy is, in part, a question of whether the government should keep secrets *from them*.

IMAGES OF SPIES

For many of us, Ian Fleming's suave, fearless, and ever-so-resourceful secret agent, James Bond, defines the concept "spy." The spy, who breaks rules and lives by his wits, has a romantic attraction in an increasingly structured and uniform world; it was said that President Kennedy himself read Fleming's books and closely followed James Bond's feats of derring-do, his fights against the agents of SPECTRE. Students may today be more familiar with Rambo than James Bond, but the point still remains. Popular culture is an important influence upon our understanding of espionage and covert action.

This activity will explore the images students have of spies and intelligence agents. Ask the class to draw a picture of "a spy," or to write a paragraph describing a spy in action. You might lead the class in a brainstorming or free-association activity to come up with a list of adjectives describing the characteristics of spies. The same activity might be repeated with the term "intelligence officer." The two lists will probably be quite different.

Discuss with students the notions they already have of spies. What purposes do they serve? Is it an important job? Why or why not? What qualifications do spies need to have?

Later in this study, it might be a good idea to return to these questions to see if students have revised their original ideas.

2

Rights and Responsibilities

THE CONSTITUTION

The founders of the United States government had lived under a government which they considered tyrannical. The King of England, George III, taxed them without representation, this and other abuses of power left the colonists with few avenues of protest save revolution. It also left the colonists quite wary of governmental power. Consequently, they struggled to create a constitution and a government that did not allow too much power in any one place. The division of powers which resulted still remains subject to political machinations.

Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution details the powers of Congress. Many of those responsibilities relate to foreign affairs.

> *"To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas and Offences against the Law of Nations,*
>
> *To Declare War, grant letter of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water;*
>
> *To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years;*
>
> *To provide and maintain a Navy;*
>
> *To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval forces;*
>
> *To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions;*
>
> *To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress."*

Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution defines the executive's power in foreign affairs.

> *"The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of*

the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States, he may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices, and he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in cases of Impeachment."

What lines are drawn in the Constitution? Which branch of government has the lead in foreign affairs?

Why was the power to go to war established in this way?

Ask students to evaluate the relevancy to today's world of these rules set up two hundred years ago. Have technological advances (such as nuclear capabilities) or other changes made these rules unworkable?

FREEDOM OF THE PRESS

Even before the thirteen colonies had won their independence, the concept of freedom of the press had caused controversy. In 1734, John Peter Zenger, a German immigrant who had come to the colonies as an indentured servant but was, at the time, editor of the *New York Weekly Journal*, began a series of attacks on New York's governor, William Cosby. Zenger was brought to trial for libel — "a defamation by printed words." Zenger's lawyer, Andrew Hamilton, argued that what Zenger printed was the truth. It could, therefore, not be considered libel. When the jury accepted that argument, Zenger had won his case, and an important press freedom had been won.

Governments complain that the press is too "liberal"; newspapers complain that the government denies citizens access to needed information about policy decisions.

The lawyer for the Governor argued, at one point in the trial, that the words used by Zenger were troublesome because they "tend to sedition, and to disquiet the minds of the people of this province." By rejecting this plea, the jury was making a statement that chaos that might emerge from the misdeeds of a public official was not a sufficient reason to censor the truth. The first amendment to the Constitution, part of the Bill of Rights adopted in 1791, made the same point. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."

The Peter Zenger decision and the first Amendment to the Constitution were both indications that at the very root of this country's history, common citizens were wary of governmental power. Watching government, reporting on the actions and inactions of government, and attempting to reform government were all proper functions of the public. Newspapers played a major role as the monitors of government, joined, in this century, by radio, movies, and television.

Freedom of the press and the public's "need to know" conflict with government secrecy. Governments often complain that the press is too powerful, or too "liberal"; newspapers complain that the government unjustly denies reporters and citizens access to needed information about policy decisions. Students might write up questionnaires which they would use in their school and community to find out about prevailing attitudes toward the press.

Sample questionnaire

- Is freedom of the press important to you?
- Do you think the press reported the last Presidential campaign adequately? Fairly?
- Is the press too friendly to the government? Is the press too critical of the government?
- Is the press too liberal? Too conservative?
- Should members of the Press reveal "classified" information? Who should decide if information should be classified? Should there be a time limit on classified information?
- Should the press try to find "secret" sources inside the government to tell them what is happening? Should the press rely on the official announcements the government makes?
- If the press learns something that is unflattering to the government, should it censor itself?
- Would you change the rights of the press? How? Why?

Students might also study the coverage of a recent political controversy (for example, the Oliver North case) to see what role the press played in explaining that story to the public.

THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT

The Freedom of Information Act was passed by Congress in 1966. Hampered by bureaucratic obstacles, the law was ineffective until a stronger version was produced in 1974 and passed over President Ford's veto. The key provisions of the law were summarized in the *Congressional Quarterly*

What did this law accomplish?

What could an individual find out that he or she could not have found out earlier?

What kind of information should be kept secret? Why?

Some people have used this law to find out whether the FBI kept files on them. Do you think that an individual has the right to know that? Should the FBI keep any files?

Invite a member of the American Civil Liberties Union to class to talk about this law and its uses.

PROVISIONS OF THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT

Congressional Quarterly, 1974

As enacted over the President's veto, HR 12471 amended the 1966 Freedom of Information Act to:

- Require federal agencies to publish their indices of final opinions on settlements of internal cases, policy statements and administrative staff manuals — or, if the indices were not published, to furnish them upon request to any person for the cost of duplication. The 1966 law simply required agencies to make such indices available for public inspection and copying.
- Reword a provision of the 1966 law to require agencies to release unlisted documents to someone requesting them with a reasonable description. This change was to ensure that an agency could not refuse to provide material simply because the applicant could not give its precise title.
- Direct each agency to publish a uniform set of fees for providing documents at the cost of finding and copying them; the amendment allowed waiver or reduction of those fees when in the public interest.
- Empower federal district courts to order agencies to produce improperly withheld documents — and to examine the contested materials privately (*in camera*) to determine if they were properly exempted under one of the nine categories. The government was required to prove that contested material was properly classified.
- Allow courts to order the government to pay attorneys' fees and court costs for persons winning suits against them under the act.
- Authorize a court to find that an agency employee acted capriciously or arbitrarily in withholding information. Such a finding would set into action Civil Service Commission proceedings to determine the need for disciplinary action. If the commission found such a need, the relevant agency would take the disciplinary action that the commission recommended.
- Amend the wording of the national defense and national security exemption to make clear that it applied only to properly classified information, clarifying congressional intent to allow review of the decision to stamp something "classified."
- Amend the wording of the law enforcement exemption to allow withholding only of information whose disclosure would interfere with enforcement proceedings, deprive someone of a fair trial or hearing, invade personal privacy in an unwarranted way, disclose the identity of a confidential source, disclose investigative techniques, or endanger law enforcement personnel. The amendment also protected from disclosure all information from a confidential source obtained by a criminal law enforcement agency or by an agency conducting a lawful national security investigation.

3

Secrecy and Covert Action in Recent Years

AN ATTEMPT TO TURN BACK THE CLOCK

When people talk about the "sixties," they are sometimes referring to the seventies. The most vehement anti-war protests occurred then, as did the most unbridgeable generation gaps, and the largest credibility gaps between the White House and the public. During this time, Watergate and the related investigations revealed a pattern of dishonesty which shocked the American public.

Promising that he would "never lie" to the American people, Jimmy Carter was the beneficiary of the public disgust over governmental crimes. Running as an outsider who would restore honesty and decency, Carter defeated Gerald Ford and was inaugurated in January 1977. Carter pledged that his government would obey the laws, and, with the assistance of his Director of Central Intelligence, Stansfield Turner, Carter reduced the powers of the CIA at the beginning of his term.

Watergate revealed a pattern of dishonesty which shocked the American public.

Carter soon found, however, that governing was difficult and that international affairs were complicated and frustrating. More information was needed on foreign governments and more options were needed in foreign policy. Near the end of his term in office, therefore, spurred on by the Iran hostage crisis and the CIA's failure to predict the fall of the Shah, Carter began to re-expand the Central Intelligence Agency. For example, a finding signed by Carter in 1979 allowed covert support to Nicaraguan journalists and politicians who opposed Sandinista policies. Carter, however, did not give permission for paramilitary operations in Nicaragua.

Ronald Reagan, elected in 1980, portrayed himself as a fervent anti-Communist, and promised to be more aggressive in international relations. Thus he was well-received by the CIA, who hoped that Reagan would ease restrictions on the agency. The activities of the agency greatly expanded, and covert operations, dormant for much of the Carter administration, once again blossomed. The new director of Central Intelligence, William Casey (Reagan's

1980 campaign manager), had served in the Office of Strategic Services, the predecessor to the CIA, during World War II. Casey and Reagan worked to return the CIA to the glory days of the OSS.

The CIA had to contend with new legislation passed near the end of Carter's term. After the Church Committee hearings, the Congress, appalled by the tales they heard of assassination plots and coups, demanded accountability. The Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980 was passed, requiring the President to send the House and Senate Intelligence Committees a finding for each new instance of covert action, explaining why the action was necessary for the good of the United States. The law aimed to prevent presidents from denying knowledge of actions carried out under their administration.

This new oversight process did limit the chief executive's scope of action. If the CIA became involved in anything, Congress would soon know. But President Reagan had certain projects planned which, it was feared, might cause controversy if made public. The administration therefore sought a way around the new rules. By establishing an alternative means for implementing covert operations, Reagan could avoid the necessity to sign a finding for the use of the CIA.

A major covert action undertaken by Reagan's National Security Council involved assistance to rebels fighting against the Nicaraguan Sandinista government. Even though the Sandinista government had been recognized officially by the United States, stories about unofficial and quasi-official American support for rebel forces, known as "freedom fighters" to their friends and "contras" to their foes, began appearing in the press. The circumstances of this aid raised the question of whether the United States government was trying to overthrow a legally recognized government in Nicaragua. Another National Security Council initiative on the other side of the world was soon linked to this action against the Nicaraguan government. Terrorism had been a controversial subject in the United States for a decade. American hostages, held by Iran for over a year, became a key issue in the 1980 election. Reagan campaigned vigorously against any dealings with terrorists, emphasizing that the United States would have nothing to do with Iran as long as it was involved in any terrorist practices. After his election, Reagan placed an arms embargo on Iran (who was then fighting a war with Iraq), and urged America's allies to follow suit. Yet, simultaneously and secretly, the White House's National Security Council was involved in an effort to trade arms with Iran to have American hostages returned. The central participants in this plan included NSC staff member Oliver North, along with William Casey, the Director of Central Intelligence, and two successive National Security Advisors, Robert McFarlane and John Poindexter. In addition to this secret plan to sell arms to Iran, a second scheme involved channeling the profits from these transactions to the Nicaraguan rebels, during a time when the United States Congress had expressly cut off any American aid to these rebels.

The Iran-Contra scandal demonstrated that the United States had a public foreign policy and a private one.

These complicated actions indicated significant erosion of Congressional efforts to rein in the intelligence operations of the executive branch. With the blessing of the CIA, Oliver North had organized an "off-the-shelf" operation outside Congressional scrutiny. At the same time, the United States military began to create new and secret teams that could also carry out covert operations. There were now a host of new ways to act secretly. Many of these covert operations were achieved without any findings written (according to law, the President was only required to file findings on the CIA, which had been bypassed). For other actions, findings had been written but *were not sent* to Congress. The ensuing Iran-Contra scandal demonstrated that the United States had a public foreign policy and a private one, and that these two were in direct contradiction with one another. The issue demanded resolution. Would the United States have two foreign policies? How could the Congress and the American people be certain that they would know and approve the actions of their government? Was foreign policy now so complicated that the public just couldn't be trusted to decide?

MEMO FROM NORTH

Oliver North used his position at the National Security Council to ensure funding for the Nicaraguan rebels. North sought to convince Congress to continue this aid, and, during times when he was unsuccessful and aid was cut off, North worked covertly to make sure that foreign governments and private sources would keep the contras supplied.

The following document, dated June 1985, is a memorandum from North to his boss, Deputy National Security Advisor Admiral John Poindexter. In this memorandum, North describes his worries that information about his behind-the-scenes fundraising will be made public. He expresses his concern about leaks emanating from the NSC, and hopes to find ways to plug them. Covert action, after all, needs to be kept secret.

Documents like this were not written for the public. However, access to documents through the Freedom of Information Act, has helped reveal much about the inner workings of government. Ask students if they should have the right to see the document given here. Invite different lawyers to class to get their opinions on this matter. How do they feel about the government's right to secrecy?

MEMORANDUM

~~SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

Non-Log

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

N- 6415

EXHIBIT OLN-186

ACTION June 3, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: OLIVER L. NORTH

SUBJECT: Press Revelations regarding North's Role with Nicaraguan Resistance

For several weeks now there have been rumors of stories being prepared which allege an NSC connection to private funding and other support to the Nicaraguan resistance. The rumors originally surfaced with a reporter Alfonso Chardi from the Miami Herald and now seem to focus more on Associated Press reporter named Robert Parry (note at Tab I). Parry is the reporter who "broke the story" on the so-called CIA "murder manual."

At my request [redacted] went to Chardi before departing for Jamba and told Chardi that if he (Chardi) printed any derogatory comments about the FDN or its funding sources that Chardi would never again be allowed to visit FDN bases or travel with their units. According to [redacted] Chardi promised to drop the story. At no time did my name or an NSC connection arise during their discussion.

The attached note from Karna is, however, more disturbing. Parry is an avowed liberal with very close connections in the Democratic party. It is also reported that he has a personal relationship with one of the NSC staff. In this regard, it should be noted that during December one of the SYSTEM IV papers on the resistance was circulated by Secretariat to other members of the NSC staff. It is subsequent to that circulation that my name began to be associated with fund raising activities for the resistance.

It is currently rumored that Parry plans to break this story before the resistance funding vote--probably Thursday. Despite Bud's admonition on the attached note (Tab I), Parry has contacted members of this staff. It may be helpful to again circulate specific instructions regarding contact with the media for those who conduct such activities. It may also be useful to reconsider the proposal of some years ago for having the NSC staff take periodic polygraph examinations.

RECOMMENDATION

That you reaffirm guidelines to the staff regarding contact with the media.

Approve [signature] Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab I - Small Note to RCM (w/reply) of May 31, 1985

~~SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED
Declassify: OADR ~~SECRET~~

1332

BKD, FBI 12-12-91 NS 30

By Declassified/Released on 21 June 1987 under provisions of E.O. 12356 by U.S. Depts. National Security Council

LEGISLATION BEARING ON IRAN-CONTRA

Boland Amendments

Congress made attempts to control military aid to the Contras during the Reagan Administration. Congress aided the Sandinistas in fiscal 1980, removed aid for 1981, and gave covert aid for fiscal 1982. In the following year, the first Boland Amendment, introduced by Congressman Edward Boland, prohibited the CIA from using funds "for the purpose of overthrowing the Government of Nicaragua." The Defense Appropriations Bill for 1984 did not include any of that language, but the Bill for 1985 contained the strictest restrictions known as the Second Boland Amendment.

Signed into law by President Reagan in October 1984, after Congress was angered by the mining of Nicaraguan harbors without its knowledge, Boland II said:

> *"During fiscal year 1985, no funds available to the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, or any other agency or entity involved in intelligence activities may be obligated or expended for the purpose or which would have the effect of supporting, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua by any nation, group, organization, movement or individual."*

Oliver North and John Poindexter interpreted this amendment to mean that the CIA could no longer aid the Contras. However, they concluded, the National Security Council was free to do so. Boland II, therefore, had no effect on Oliver North.

The Hughes-Ryan Amendment was a short section of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974. Passed in the midst of the investigations of the CIA launched by Congress during the Nixon-Ford Administration, the amendment attempted to end the ability of the Chief Executive to claim that he was unaware of CIA operations.

Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 states:

> *"Limitation on Intelligence Activities — No funds appropriated under the authority of this or any other Act may be expended by or on behalf of the Central Intelligence Agency for operations in foreign countries, other than activities intended solely for obtaining necessary intelligence, unless and until the President finds that each such operation is important to the national security of the United States and reports, in a timely fashion, a description and scope of each operation to the appropriate committees of Congress."*

After the 1980 Intelligence Oversight Act was passed, these "findings" went to the Intelligence Committees established by the House and the Senate.

The following Presidential finding, written on January 17, 1986, described how the United States would become involved with a "third country" to facili-

tate negotiations with Iran. The United States, with the assistance of Israel, would send arms to Iran. In turn, the Iranian elements with whom the United States and Israel were dealing would see to it that American hostages were released. The result of the negotiations became the well-known "arms for hostages" deal. Also provided here is a memo from Admiral Poindexter to President Reagan which fills in the background information alluded to in the finding. The President followed the advice offered here by Poindexter — the finding was not sent to the Intelligence Committees until a later date. The Reagan administration would later argue that Hughes-Ryan referred only to the CIA; spokespersons argued that NSC activities did not have to be reported.

Did these documents comply with the rules set up by Congress? Explain. Ask students to decide where the rules of Congress were violated. What do they think about these violations? Were they needed for the reasons of national security?

[redacted]

Finding Pursuant to Section 662 of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended, Concerning Operations Undertaken by the Central Intelligence Agency in Foreign Countries, Other Than Those Intended Solely for the Purpose of Intelligence Collection

I hereby find that the following operation in a foreign country (including all support necessary to such operation) is important to the national security of the United States, and due to its extreme sensitivity and security risks, I determine it is essential to limit prior notice, and direct the Director of Central Intelligence to refrain from reporting this Finding to the Congress as provided in Section 501 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, until I otherwise direct.

SCOPE	DESCRIPTION
Iran	Assist selected friendly foreign liaison services, third countries and third parties which have established relationships with Iranian elements, groups, and individuals sympathetic to U.S. Government interests and which do not conduct or support terrorist actions directed against U.S. persons, property or interests, for the purpose of: (1) establishing a more moderate government in Iran, (2) obtaining from them significant intelligence not otherwise obtainable, to determine the current Iranian Government's intentions with respect to its neighbors and with respect to terrorist acts, and (3) furthering the release of the American hostages held in Beirut and preventing additional terrorist acts by these groups. Provide funds, intelligence, counter-intelligence, training, guidance and communications and other necessary assistance to these elements, groups, individuals, liaison services and third countries in support of these activities. The USG will act to facilitate efforts by third parties and third countries to establish contact with moderate elements within and outside the Government of Iran by providing these elements with arms, equipment and related materiel in order to enhance the credibility of these elements in their effort to achieve a more pro-U.S. government in Iran by demonstrating their ability to obtain requisite resources to defend their country against Iraq and intervention by the Soviet Union. This support will be discontinued if the U.S. Government learns that these elements have abandoned their goals of moderating their government and appropriated the materiel for purposes other than that provided by this Finding.

The White House
Washington, D.C.
Date January 17, [redacted]

Ronald Reagan

OGCR TS C801-86
Copy 1

[redacted]

X2

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UNCLASSIFIED

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 17, 1986

~~TOP SECRET~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JOHN M. POINDEXTER

SUBJECT: Covert Action Finding Regarding Iran

Prime Minister Peres of Israel secretly dispatched his special adviser on terrorism with instructions to propose a plan by which Israel, with limited assistance from the U.S., can create conditions to help bring about a more moderate government in Iran. The Israelis are very concerned that Iran's deteriorating position in the war with Iraq, the potential for further radicalization in Iran, and the possibility of enhanced Soviet influence in the Gulf all pose significant threats to the security of Israel. They believe it is essential that they act to at least preserve a balance of power in the region.

The Israeli plan is premised on the assumption that moderate elements in Iran can come to power if these factions demonstrate their credibility in defending Iran against Iraq and in deterring Soviet intervention. To achieve the strategic goal of a more moderate Iranian government, the Israelis are prepared to unilaterally commence selling military materiel to Western-oriented Iranian factions. It is their belief that by so doing they can achieve a heretofore unobtainable penetration of the Iranian governing hierarchy. The Israelis are convinced that the Iranians are so desperate for military materiel, expertise and intelligence that the provision of these resources will result in favorable long-term changes in personnel and attitudes within the Iranian government. Further, once the exchange relationship has commenced, a dependency would be established on those who are providing the requisite resources, thus allowing the provider(s) to coercively influence near-term events. Such an outcome is consistent with our policy objectives and would present significant advantages for U.S. national interests. As described by the Prime Minister's emissary, the only requirement the Israelis have is an assurance that they will be allowed to purchase U.S. replenishments for the stocks that they sell to Iran. We have researched the legal problems of Israel's selling U.S. manufactured arms to Iran. Because of the requirement in U.S. law for recipients of U.S. arms to notify the U.S. government of transfers to third countries, I do not recommend that you agree with the specific details of the Israeli plan. However, there is another possibility. Some time ago Attorney

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Declassified/Released on 28 Jan 1992 under provisions of E.O. 12356

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General William French Smith determined that under an appropriate finding you could authorize the CIA to sell arms to countries outside of the provisions of the laws and reporting requirements for foreign military sales. The objectives of the Israeli plan could be met if the CIA, using an authorized agent as necessary, purchased arms from the Department of Defense under the Economy Act and then transferred them to Iran directly after receiving appropriate payment from Iran.

The Covert Action Finding attached at Tab A provides the latitude for the transactions indicated above to proceed. The Iranians have indicated an immediate requirement for 4,000 basic TOW weapons for use in the launchers they already hold.

The Israeli's are also sensitive to a strong U.S. desire to free our Beirut hostages and have insisted that the Iranians demonstrate both influence and good intent by an early release of the five Americans. Both sides have agreed that the hostages will be immediately released upon commencement of this action. Prime Minister Peres had his emissary pointedly note that they well understand our position on not making concessions to terrorists. They also point out, however, that terrorist groups, movements, and organizations are significantly easier to influence through governments than they are by direct approach. In that we have been unable to exercise any suasion over Hizballah during the course of nearly two years of kidnappings, this approach through the government of Iran may well be our only way to achieve the release of the Americans held in Beirut. It must again be noted that since this dialogue with the Iranians began in September, Reverend Weir has been released and there have been no Shia terrorist attacks against American or Israeli persons, property, or interests.

Therefore it is proposed that Israel make the necessary arrangements for the sale of 4000 TOW weapons to Iran. Sufficient funds to cover the sale would be transferred to an agent of the CIA. The CIA would then purchase the weapons from the Department of Defense and deliver the weapons to Iran through the agent. If all of the hostages are not released after the first shipment of 1000 weapons, further transfers would cease.

On the other hand, since hostage release is in some respects a byproduct of a larger effort to develop ties to potentially moderate forces in Iran, you may wish to redirect such transfers to other groups within the government at a later time.

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The Israelis have asked for our urgent response to this proposal so that they can plan accordingly. They note that conditions inside both Iran and Lebanon are highly volatile. The Israelis are cognizant that this entire operation will be terminated if the Iranians abandon their goal of moderating their government or allow further acts of terrorism. You have discussed the general outlines of the Israeli plan with Secretaries Shultz and Weinberger, Attorney General Meese and Director Casey. The Secretaries do not recommend you proceed with this plan. Attorney General Meese and Director Casey believe the short-term and long-term objectives of the plan warrant the policy risks involved and recommend you approve the attached Finding. Because of the extreme sensitivity of this project, it is recommended that you exercise your statutory prerogative to withhold notification of the Finding to the Congressional oversight committees until such time that you deem it to be appropriate.

Recommendation

OK NO

RR — That you sign the attached Finding.

Prepared by:
Oliver L. North

Attachment
Tab A - Covert Action Finding

1100 17 Jan 86

President was briefed verbally from this paper.
VP, Don Regan and Don Fortier were present.

[redacted] X2

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THE IRAN-CONTRA COMMITTEE

The Iran-Contra affair brought about the largest investigation into covert action since the Church Committee hearings a decade earlier. On January 6, 1987, the Senate set up the Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition. The next day, the House followed suit, establishing the Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran.

The Iran-Contra affair brought about the largest investigation into covert action since the Church Committee hearings a decade earlier.

These two committees decided to work together. They reviewed over 300,000 documents, held forty days of public hearings, and listened to testimony from five hundred witnesses. Provided here is an excerpt from the final report entitled "Covert Action in a Democratic Society." The committees here try to describe the tensions between covert action and democratic process.

Using the conclusions of the Iran-Contra Committee as a guide, divide the class into groups and conduct polls of various parts of your community. Do people know what covert action is? Do people know what happened in the Iran-Contra affair? What do they think about Oliver North? Who do they think should decide about covert actions? The President? The CIA? The Congress? Have students discuss the responses they received. Try to conclude what public opinion is in your community on these issues.

COVERT ACTION IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY

Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition, 1987 (excerpt)

Out of necessity, covert activities are conducted, and nearly all are approved and monitored, in secret. Because they are not subject to public debate and scrutiny, they must be examined carefully within the practical constraints imposed by the need for operational security. It has been the United States' historic achievement to develop a system of law, using statutes, executive orders, regulations, notification procedures, that provides this scrutiny and protection. The Committees conclude:

(a) Covert operations are a necessary component of our Nation's foreign policy. They can supplement, not replace, diplomacy and normal instruments of foreign policy. As National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane testified, "it is clearly unwise to rely on covert action as the core of our policy." The government must be able to gain and sustain popular support for its foreign policy through open, public debate.

(b) Covert operations are compatible with democratic government if they are conducted in an accountable manner and in accordance with law. Laws mandate reporting and prior notice to Congress. Covert action Findings are not a license to violate the statutes of the United States.

(c) As the Church Committee wrote more than a dozen years ago, "covert actions should be consistent with publicly defined United States foreign policy goals." But the policies themselves cannot be secret.

(d) All Government operations, including covert action operations, must be funded from appropriated monies or from funds known to the appropriate committees of the Congress and subject to Congressional control. This principle is at the heart of our constitutional system of checks and balances.

(e) The intelligence agencies must deal in a spirit of good faith with the Congress. Both new and ongoing covert action operations must be fully reported, not cloaked by broad Findings. Answers that are technically true, but misleading, are unacceptable.

(f) Congress must have the will to exercise oversight over covert operations. The intelligence committees are the surrogates for the public on covert action operations. They must monitor the intelligence agencies with that responsibility in mind.

(g) The Congress also has a responsibility to ensure that sensitive information from the executive branch remains secure when it is shared with the Congress. A need exists for greater consensus between the Legislative and executive branches on the sharing and protection of information.

(h) The gathering, analysis, and reporting of intelligence should be done in such a way that there can be no question that the conclusions are driven by the actual facts, rather than by what a policy advocate hopes these facts will be.

It has been observed that a country without enemies has no need of an army or an intelligence agency.

The United States of America, as a great power with worldwide interests, will continue to have to deal with nations that have different hopes, values, and ambitions. These differences will inevitably lead to conflicts. History reflects that the

prospects for peaceful settlement are greater if this country has adequate means for its own defense, including effective intelligence and the means to influence developments abroad.

Organized and structured secret intelligence activities are one of the realities of the world we live in, and this is not likely to change. Like the military, intelligence services are fully compatible with democratic government when their actions are conducted in an accountable manner and in accordance with law.

This country has been fortunate to have a military that is sensitive to the constraints built into the Constitution and to the necessity of respecting the Congress' responsibilities. This attitude of the military has won the trust of the American people, as George C. Marshall, the Chief of Staff of the Army during World War II, explained to one of his officers:

> *But we have a great asset and that is that our people, our countrymen, do not distrust us and do not fear us. Our countrymen, our fellow citizens, are not afraid of us. They don't harbor any ideas that we intend to alter the government of the country or the nature of this government in any way. This is a sacred trust.*

Like the military, the intelligence services can function only with the trust and support of their countrymen. If they are to earn that trust, they must heed Marshall's words.

COVERT ACTION STILL CONTINUES

Covert action was in the spotlight during the Iran-Contra affair. Even when the Boland Amendment had forbidden funding for anti-Sandinista forces in Nicaragua, the National Security Council made sure that money kept flowing, by selling arms to Iran and diverting the profits to the Nicaraguan rebels.

The National Security Council made sure that money kept flowing.

Even after that affair became a public scandal, reports of quiet operations continued to surface in which the private actions of our government did not match its public statements. In the summer of 1988, the *New York Times* exposed a propaganda operation in Central America. Although President Arias of Costa Rica had won worldwide acclaim (including the Nobel Prize) for his efforts on behalf of peace, the United States launched a propaganda campaign aimed at lowering the esteem in which Arias was held.

Ask students how they feel about this article. Do they think such propaganda is a good idea? How can they express their support of such actions?

Are they angered? What do they think they can do? What would be effective?

Do they think that responses by private citizens will affect government policy? Why or why not?

OFFICIALS ASSERT U.S. IS TRYING TO WEAKEN COSTA RICA CHIEF

By Stephen Kinzer with Robert Pear, *New York Times* (August 5, 1988)

San Jose, Costa Rica, Aug. 4 — Publicly, the United States has praised President Oscar Arias Sánchez of Costa Rica for leading the quest for peace in Central America. But privately, Reagan Administration officials have taken steps to embarrass and undermine him, and have derisively referred to him as "the laureate," according to political leaders here and in Washington.

Reagan Administration officials say the Costa Rican President has been naïve in his assessment of the Sandinista Government of Nicaragua and has formed a working alliance with Democrats in Congress to halt shipments of weapons to the Nicaraguan rebels.

A Prize for Defiance?

Mr. Arias won the Nobel Peace Prize last October for his efforts to end the fighting in Central America. A top State Department official said this week: "He won the prize for de-funding the contras and taking an anti-American stance. It was largely a prize for defying the United States."

Officials in Washington and San José said friction between the two countries had shown itself in several ways:

- The Costa Rican Ambassador to the United States, Guido Fernández, was replaced after Administration officials and Republican members of Congress complained that he had lobbied against President Reagan's proposals to send weapons to the contras. Mr. Arias asked Congress to halt such assistance and "give peace a chance" when he visited Washington last September.
- Mr. Arias has ordered his border guards and police officers to arrest contras operating from Costa Rican territory. In 1986, he ordered the closure of an airstrip built secretly in Costa Rica by associates of Oliver L. North, who was then on the staff of the National Security Council. The airstrip was to have become part of the United States' clandestine network for supplying the contras. Mr. Arias also upset American officials this year when he ordered senior contra leaders living in Costa Rica to leave the country or drop out of the contra leadership.
- The United States successfully demanded that Mr. Arias's closest confidant, John Biehl, be dismissed from his position with the United Nations Development Program. American officials say he violated the rules for international civil servants by lobbying in Washington against aid to the contras.
- American officials provided information that led to the arrest of one of Mr. Arias's campaign supporters on charges of laundering drug money. And American officials helped publicize an audit charging that millions of dollars of American aid had been mismanaged in Costa Rica.

U.S. Tries to Hinder Arias, Officials Say

José S. Sorzano, who worked on the staff of the National Security Council until June of this year, described the view of many White House officials. "Publicly, the Reagan Administration refers to Arias in a cordial, friendly fashion," he said. "But actually, privately, they have a low opinion of him that borders on despising him. And Arias reciprocates. He has a low opinion of the Reagan Administration."

The tension between the two countries dramatizes the Reagan Administration's

difficulty in winning support for its policies in Central America. Costa Rica, the region's oldest, most stable democracy, and Guatemala rebuffed the United States this week when Secretary of State George P. Shultz asked them to join in a strong denunciation of Nicaragua.

When Mr. Shultz visited Costa Rica on July 1, he praised Mr. Arias as a man "admired throughout the world for his noble efforts on behalf of peace."

But Robert W. Kagan, a former aide to Elliott Abrams, the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, said, "Arias, more than any other Latin leader, single-handedly undid U.S. policy in Nicaragua."

Mr. Kagan said that when Mr. Arias won the Nobel Prize, "all of us who thought it was important to get aid for the contras reacted with disgust, unbridled disgust."

Though Mr. Arias has enemies in Washington, he also has important friends and admirers, including Jim Wright, the Speaker of the House, and Senator Christopher J. Dodd, Democrat of Connecticut and chairman of the Foreign Relations subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere.

An Anti-Arias Drive: Perception or Reality?

Mr. Arias is extremely circumspect when publicly discussing his relations with the United States. But friends and associates of the Costa Rican President says he believes the United States is waging a campaign against him.

"I don't think there is a real conspiracy against Oscar by the top Reagan Administration people," said Daniel Oduber, who was President of Costa Rica from 1974 to 1978. "But some lower-ranking American officials, both in Washington and in Central America, are making his life difficult. They want to impose their will on him. They want him to act in support of their strategic goals in Central America, rather than in the best interests of Costa Rica."

Fernando Zumbado, Costa Rica's Minister of Housing, said: "It's obvious that there are people, Americans as well as Costa Ricans, who have set out to weaken Oscar. I have the very strong feeling that efforts are being made to undermine him."

American officials said the United States Government had no plans to provide money to opponents of Mr. Arias, and the American Ambassador to Costa Rica, Deane R. Hinton, said he was "horrified" by disclosure of a United States Government audit showing Costa Rican mismanagement of American aid because it was "filled with inaccuracies." He denied that the United States had been working to weaken Mr. Arias.

"We don't agree with everything he does by a long shot," Mr. Hinton said in an interview. "I encourage him to do or not to do things. That's my job. But a systematic campaign? Certainly not."

'Quarrels With Brothers Tend to Be More Bitter'

"Costa Rica and the United States are both genuine and successful democracies, but their leaders don't see eye to eye," said a European ambassador in San José. "We're seeing that quarrels with brothers tend to be more bitter than those with distant relations."

Mr. Arias was elected in February 1986 and had his first conflict with Washington even before he was inaugurated. He turned down a State Department request that he grant asylum to Ferdinand E. Marcos, the President of the Philippines, who was later granted asylum in Hawaii.

Soon after taking office in May 1986, Mr. Arias began working on a regional peace plan designed to end armed

conflicts and encourage democracy in Central America. On Aug. 7, 1987, a version of the plan was signed by Mr. Arias and the Presidents of Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala.

One of the most important provisions was a ban on the use of territory in Central America by "irregular forces" seeking to overthrow other regimes in the area. If observed, this provision would have crippled President Reagan's policy toward Nicaragua by ending the use of Honduran and Salvadoran bases to aid the contras. Neither Honduras nor El Salvador actually stopped aiding the guerrillas, but after the Arias plan was signed, they came under more criticism for doing so.

The Arias plan also provided an argument for members of Congress opposed to the contras. Many said they were voting against contra aid bills backed by the Administration because such aid would subvert the plan.

"The Arias plan," Mr. Sorzano said, "gave liberal Democrats in the House an opportunity to kill the Reagan program by chanting, 'Give peace a chance.' "

The Biehl Case: Victim or Meddler?

Those who support Mr. Reagan's position on aid to the contras were infuriated when they heard that Mr. Biehl, one of Mr. Arias's top advisers, was lobbying against it.

Mr. Biehl wrote many of Mr. Arias's speeches and helped formulate many of his policies, including the regional peace plan. He also directed the quiet campaign that helped Mr. Arias win the Nobel Prize.

In June of 1987, Senator Robert W. Kasten Jr. of Wisconsin, the ranking Republican on the foreign operations panel of the Appropriations Committee, wrote a letter to the United Nations Development Progam complaining about Mr. Biehl's activities and suggesting that his continued employment might endanger United States contributions to the program.

Mr. Kasten's letter was published in La Nación, the leading Costa Rican newspaper, and Mr. Biehl was forced to quit the program. Costa Rican officials assert that the letter was made available by the State Department to embarrass Mr. Arias. State Department officials neither confirm nor deny the suggestion.

After leaving his United Nations post, Mr. Biehl continued to advise Mr. Arias and remained critical of the contras and the Reagan Administration. American officials pressed Mr. Arias to dismiss him, and in June, Mr. Biehl announced that he was leaving Costa Rica to return to his native Chile.

"President Arias has had the courage, or perhaps the arrogance, to confront Reagan, to tell him, 'I know Central America better than you and your advisers,' " Mr. Biehl said.

Aides to Mr. Arias said he was distressed to lose the man widely viewed as his alter ego.

Mr. Biehl is not the only member of the Arias inner circle to have come under attack from Washington. Ambassador Fernández was recalled to Costa Rica in March after Mr. Abrams and other Administration officials said he had been lobbying against aid to the contras.

Mr. Fernandez, now Costa Rica's Minister of Information, denied the assertions. He said he had visited Capitol Hill only at the request of members of Congress to transmit Mr. Arias's views regarding Central America.

Arias's Goal: 'Friendship, Not Slavery'

Several leaders of the National Liberation Party, to which Mr. Arias belongs, suggested in interviews that the United

States is waging a campaign against him.

"The political reality is that Oscar Arias believes the United States is after him," said a former Cabinet minister. "In the party, the belief exists that there is a strong United States effort directed against Arias."

Although Mr. Arias would make no direct comment, friends said a newspaper column he published July 4 was intended as a message to the United States.

"My opposition to Washington's policy has surprised some people," he wrote. "I propose to show the entire world that a well-founded friendship between two brother peoples allows us to agree at times but also to differ; that when the small one always does what the big one wants, that is not friendship, but slavery."

"I propose to show the world that, small and poor as my Costa Rica may be, we can have our own ideas, independent judgment, autonomy and dignity."

4

The Growth of the National Security State

OPEN DIPLOMACY

When the First World War began in August 1914, most observers believed that the fighting would be over by Christmas. Instead, the warring countries found themselves in a stalemate, and months turned into years. By the time the United States entered the war in 1917, the world was weary of fighting. President Woodrow Wilson spoke to this feeling in January 1918, offering "Fourteen Points" on what victory was going to accomplish.

Some of Wilson's principles were quite specific. In an effort to prevent World War I, a war which, he felt, was caused by excessive nationalism, from happening again, Wilson preached the gospel of self-determination. If the Poles, for instance, had their own country, and the Greeks and Slovaks had theirs, and the Southern Slavs had theirs, future hostilities could be avoided. Most of the fourteen points outlined Wilson's territorial suggestions for the post-war world.

Wilson's speech also provided an eloquent statement of the ways in which international relations should be practiced. Wilson believed that secret alliances had caused the war, and so, in his statement, he advocated measures to promote open diplomacy, measures he believed would prevent war's recurrence. The following is an excerpt from Wilson's "Speech of the Fourteen Points" that raises the question of secrecy in government.

Although Wilson always spoke about the importance of principles in international affairs, he was not opposed to using American firepower when he deemed it necessary. This was true even before World War I. When revolts in Mexico frightened Wilson's vision of the proper power structure in our southern neighbor, he did not hesitate to use covert action to accomplish his aims. This willingness to act might be traced back to the purposes of foreign policy.

Divide the class in half and discuss these two propositions: a. The role of the U.S. government is to protect American interests in whatever way is necessary.

b. The role of the U.S. government is to balance American interests with those of the rest of the world.

SPEECH ON THE FOURTEEN POINTS

Woodrow Wilson, January 8, 1918
(excerpt)

It will be our wish and purpose that the processes of peace, when they are begun, shall be absolutely open, and that they shall involve and permit henceforth no secret understandings of any kind. The day of conquest and aggrandizement is gone by; so is also the day of secret covenants entered into in the interest of particular governments and likely at some unlooked-for moment to upset the peace of the world. It is this happy fact, now clear to the view of every public man whose thoughts do not still linger in an age that is dead and gone, which makes it possible for every nation whose purposes are consistent with the justice and the peace of the world to avow now or at any other time the objects it has in view.

We entered this war because violations of right had occurred which touched us to the quick and made the life of our own people impossible unless they were corrected and the world secured once for all against their recurrence. What we demand in this war, therefore, is nothing peculiar to ourselves. It is that the world be made fit and safe to live in; and particularly that it be made safe for every peace-loving nation which, like our own, wishes to live its own life, determine its own institutions, be assured of justice and fair dealings by the other peoples of the world, as against force and selfish aggression. All the peoples of the world are in effect partners in this interest, and for our own part we see very clearly that unless justice be done to others it will not be done to us.

In regard to these essential rectifications of wrong and assertions of right, we feel ourselves to be intimate partners of all the governments and peoples associated together against the imperialists. We cannot be separated in interest or divided in purpose. We stand together until the end.

For such arrangements and covenants we are willing to fight and to continue to fight until they are achieved; but only because we wish the right to prevail and desire a just and stable peace, such as can be secured only by removing the chief provocations to war, which this program does remove. We have no jealousy of German greatness, and there is nothing in this program that impairs it. We grudge her no achievement or distinction of learning or of pacific enterprise such as have made her record very bright and very enviable. We do not wish to injure her or to block in any way her legitimate influence or power. We do not wish to fight her either with arms or with hostile arrangements of trade, if she is willing to associate herself with us and the other peace-loving nations of the world in covenants of justice and law and fair dealing. We wish her only to accept a place of equality among the peoples of the world — the new world in which we now live — instead of a place of mastery.

Neither do we presume to suggest to her any alteration or modification of her institutions. But it is necessary, we must frankly say, and necessary as a preliminary to any intelligent dealings with her on our part, that we should know whom her spokesmen speak for when they speak to us, whether for the Reichstag majority or for the military party and the men whose creed is imperial domination.

We have spoken, now, surely, in terms too concrete to admit of any further doubt or question. An evident principle runs through the whole program I have outlined. It is the principle of justice to all peoples and nationalities, and their right to live on equal terms of liberty and safety with one another, whether they be strong or weak. Unless this principle be made its foundation, no part of the structure of international justice can stand. The people of the United States could act upon no other principle, and to the vindication of this principle they are ready to devote their lives, their honor, and everything that they possess. The moral climax of this, the culminating and final war for human liberty, has come, and they are ready to put their own strength, their own highest purpose, their own integrity and devotion to the test.

THE ORIGINS OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

The United States has not declared war on a foreign nation in over forty years. After the bombing of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, President Roosevelt asked for and received a Declaration of War against Japan. Shortly thereafter, Adolf Hitler, the Fuhrer of Nazi Germany, declared war on the United States. From 1941 until 1945, the United States was a major participant in World War II, fighting on many fronts and supplying arms to all those who were the enemies of our enemies. In strictly constitutional terms, the nation has not fought a war since.

The end of World War II, however, did not bring about an era of universal peace. On the contrary, technological and political developments altered warfare and the lives of all peoples of the world. The explosion of the atomic bomb gave war a qualitatively different face. Potential enemies, particularly if they possessed nuclear weapons or the potential to acquire them, could not be ignored. American policymakers recognized this new set of circumstances and sought to meet this challenge in various ways.

A nation needed a properly functioning intelligence capability if it were to survive the atomic age. The United States had to have a way to forecast future events.

One lesson which had been learned from Pearl Harbor, and had been repeatedly emphasized ever since that "day of infamy," was that a nation needed a properly functioning intelligence capability if it were to survive the atomic age. The United States had to have a way to forecast future events and to be able to get accurate information on the activities of other nations in the world.

During the war, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), run by Colonel William "Wild Bill" Donovan, carried out many secret missions. Stories about OSS agents inspired many books and movies after the war, presenting a human dimension to conflict, which was becoming quite technological. Cloak-and-dagger stores excited the public and preserved a romantic idea of war.

Max Corvo was in charge of OSS operations in Italy during World War II. In a recent history, he described the scope of his wartime activities:

> *I joined OSS in 1942 and was later stationed in Algiers, where we set up administration offices, propaganda, and began planning to send men and materials into Italy and Sicily. Sardinia was also a target . . . [We succeeded in penetrating the Italian] government, the army, the Foreign Ministry, and other government departments . . . [and the Vatican] . . . First, I recruited hundreds of Sicilian-Americans for secret operations. Many were used behind the lines. . . . We dropped supplies, agents, and officers, supplied partisan groups, and helped shorten the war by months. We ran 24 clandestine radio stations that transmitted 125,000 cipher groups per month. We dropped more than 1 million pounds of material*

> — weapons, food, etcetera. We trained the Italian underground. Men like Captain E. Q. Daddario captured Fascist leaders like Marshal Rudolfo Graziani and other ministers. We also constantly collected political and military intelligence.
>
> [Quirk, Stein, and Day, *The Central Intelligence Agency* (Briar Cliff Manor, NY: Foreign Intelligence Press, 1986)]

Although the OSS was disbanded at the end of World War II, President Truman decided that a permanent intelligence agency was needed to sustain American power in the emerging post-war environment. The United States began to see the Soviet Union not just as a competitor, but as an aggressive rival and growing threat to the "American way of life." In this new "Cold War," the United States felt itself facing a power which, it was said, had beliefs and ideals completely opposed to those of liberal democracy. The United States was confident that it represented the ideal of human freedom, and charged the Soviet Union with seeking ways to enslave the world.

In the days immediately following World War II, the United States, along with a few other western nations, recruited many Nazis — former enemies — who then provided intelligence to the United States about the Soviet Union.

In response to this situation, a Central Intelligence Group (CIG) was briefly established near the beginning of 1946, but soon gave way to the Central Intelligence Agency in 1947. The duties and responsibilities of the CIA were related to those of the National Security Council, which was set up by the same act. Its mandate could be interpreted quite broadly, and was. The Central Intelligence Agency was to gather information about this implacable enemy and to come up with ways for the Free World to respond to the challenges said to be threatening the balance of power in the world. In this way, the CIA would be assisting the National Security Council, which advises the President on matters of national security.

This division of the world into good versus evil led to some mind-boggling secret partnerships even before the CIA was established. In the days immediately following World War II, the United States, along with a few other western nations, recruited many Nazis — former enemies — who then provided intelligence to the United States about the Soviet Union. Klaus Barbie, known as the "Butcher of Lyons," was one of these new employees of the United States. Later, during the first years of the CIA, some of these former Nazis served on secret missions carried out by the United States. Some agents were placed in eastern Europe to gather information about life behind the "Iron Curtain." Others were parachuted in to undertake riskier operations; these occasional attempts to undermine Communist governments never succeeded.

But despite questionable operations such as these, the Central Intelligence Agency enjoyed a favorable reputation with most Americans in the early post-war years. The CIA was seen to be fighting the battle for freedom in the new

front lines. The agency attracted idealistic young officers eager to see American-style democracy triumph throughout the world. It also appealed to those who felt that the world was a tough place, and that the United States had to be clever and bold to compete with the USSR, and all other enemies that emerged.

The CIA undertook a variety of tasks after 1947. It collected and analyzed information, and kept that information secure through a rigorous system of counterintelligence. All countries played the game. That complicated things immensely. If your intelligence agent reported new information about your enemy, the possibility always existed that the enemy knew about your operation and was feeding you false information. The procedures involved to make sure that the intelligence you received was true became highly complex. Counterintelligence operations had the responsibility to make sure that the agents who worked for the United States really did so.

The CIA also carried out covert operations. Some of these operations were propaganda exercises, others were political action campaigns, and others can be considered paramilitary operations. Major CIA activities in all of these categories began in 1948. Fearing Communist Party victories in the Italian election of 1948, great amounts of political and financial aid were given to anti-Communist politicians. The subsequent victory of centrist parties was a triumph for the fledgling CIA.

Political action fell to the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), a bureau of the CIA. Frank Wisner, who had served in the OSS in Germany, became the first head of the OPC and, under his leadership, the office became involved in foreign political parties and labor unions, in such media operations as the establishment of Radio Free Europe, and in other operations throughout eastern Europe. The CIA, originally intended, according to American diplomat George Kennan, as "a facility which could be used when and if an occasion arose when it might be needed," became bigger and more powerful every year.

The following is an excerpt from the original government bill setting up the Central Intelligence Agency. The CIA was established to coordinate intelligence on foreign affairs for the National Security Council. The FBI remained responsible for domestic investigations.

Ask the students to discuss the kinds of activities this new organization was supposed to do. What branch of government was responsible for this organization? Does the bill describe any limits to the power of the CIA? What are they? What control does Congress exercise over the CIA?

You might also want to review with students the activities of Max Corvo, and the activities of the CIA mentioned throughout this section of the book. Do these activities match the students' image of a secret agent?

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Sec. 102. (a) There is established under the National Security Council a Central Intelligence Agency with a Director of Central Intelligence who shall be the head thereof, and with a Deputy Director of Central Intelligence who shall act for, and exercise the powers of, the Director during his absence or disability. The Director and the Deputy Director shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, from among the commissioned officers of the armed services, whether in an active or retired status, or from among individuals in civilian life: *Provided, however*, That at no time shall the two positions of the Director and Deputy Director be occupied simultaneously by commissioned officers of the armed services, whether in an active or retired status. . . .

(d) For the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several Government departments and agencies in the interest of national security, it shall be the duty of the Agency, under the direction of the National Security Council—

(1) to advise the National Security Council in matters concerning such intelligence activities of the Government departments and agencies as relate to national security;

(2) to make recommendations to the National Security Council for the coordination of such intelligence activities of the departments and agencies of the Government as relate to the national security;

(3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government using where appropriate existing agencies and facilities: *Provided*, That the Agency shall have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or internal-security functions: *Provided further*, That the departments and other agencies of the Government shall continue to collect, evaluate, correlate, and disseminate departmental intelligence: *And provided further*, That the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure;

(4) to perform, for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies, such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally;

(5) to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct.

(e) To the extent recommended by the National Security Council and approved by the President, such intelligence of the departments and agencies of the Government, except as hereinafter provided, relating to the national security shall be open to the inspection of the Director of Central Intelligence, and such intelligence as relates to the national security and is possessed by such departments and other agencies of the Government, except as hereinafter provided, shall be made available to the Director of Central Intelligence for correlation, evaluation, and dissemination: *Provided, however*, That upon the written request of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall make available to the Director of Central Intelligence such information for correlation, evaluation, and dissemination as may be essential to the national security.

THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, JANUARY 1975


The President
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
National Security Council
Forty Committee (Covert Action)
U.S. Intelligence Board (Board of Directors)
Secretary of Defense
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
National Security Agency (NSA)
State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR)
CIA Director (Director of Central Intelligence [DCI])
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
Army, Navy, Air Force Intelligence
Treasury Department Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

Source: Loch Johnson, A Season of Inquiry (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1985)

CIA ORGANIZATION, 1975



Source: John Ranelagh, The Agency (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986)

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THE IRON CURTAIN AND THE FREE WORLD

After the Second World War, the cabinet of the United States underwent a change — the Secretary of War turned into the Secretary of Defense. It was a time when the "Free World" and the "Iron Curtain" countries were seen as bitter enemies who would inevitably clash in the near future. Policymakers in the United States often referred to Eastern Europe, where governments under the thumb of the Soviet Union had been installed after World War II, as the "denied areas."

Ask students about the feelings and ideas these words and phrases bring to mind. You might then have students look at magazines and newspapers published between 1945 and 1953 to discover the detailed meaning of the terms and phrases used to describe the power blocs in the world during that time. Different newspapers and magazines use words in various ways. It would be quite worthwhile to have students work in groups and use a variety of sources. Have them compare *Time* with *The Nation*, for example, or *The New York Times* with *The Chicago Tribune*.

COVERT ACTION AND DEMOCRACY

In the winter of 1988, a symposium was held at Tufts University on the subject of secrecy and American foreign policy. This symposium, entitled "Covert Action and Democracy," examined the tension between these two concepts. The keynote address was delivered by William Miller, who served in the United States Foreign Service as a political officer in Teheran, Iran. Miller later became the staff officer of the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence. This body, known as the Church Committee, launched the key investigation into the workings of the American intelligence community of the 1970s.

In the following excerpt from his speech, Miller traced the events of the years immediately following World War II, years that changed the way in which the United States viewed the world. After students read this excerpt, you might ask them the following: What did United States policy makers see when they looked at the world after World War II? Had the war brought peace? Did it bring anything else? How did NSC68 describe the Soviet Union? How did these assumptions about the Soviet Union affect the growth of secret government in the United States?

Invite several World War II veterans to class. Have students prepare questions for them about their ideas on the reasons for that war. What were they fighting for?

Then ask these veterans their attitudes after the war. Was there a new enemy? Who? Was the new enemy similar to Hitler? Did the world seem different after World War II because of nuclear weapons? Did people feel safe and secure, or threatened?

National Security Council Memorandum #68

Excerpt from the Tufts University symposium
William Miller

It seems to me that the great issues of secrecy and Constitutional balance arise in 1945. We had just finished a terrible war, that ended in a blinding flash at Hiroshima. This new awesome power seemed to be both a scourge and perhaps a solution to all wars. At the same time, the great promises at the end of war were very quickly dashed. The United Nations was quickly confronted with Azerbaijan, with the collapse of central Europe, and the takeover of a number of tottering states that were a result of collapsing colonialism.

There was a sense that the Second World War was not over, that it was simply an extension of war that we were engaged in, that disbanding had left us vulnerable to our enemies, and that we had to re-arm to face a new, very formidable enemy. . . . A very important appreciation of the world [was expressed] in one of the most important historical documents of the post-war period. National Security Council memorandum #68 [was] written at the request of Harry Truman after it was discovered that the Soviets had acquired the ability to make nuclear weapons.

This is the analysis of the situation offered by the memorandum.

> *Within the past 35 years the world has experienced two global wars of tremendous violence. It has witnessed two revolutions, the Russian and the Chinese, of extreme scope and intensity. It has also seen the collapse of five empires. Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian, German, Italian and Japanese, and the drastic decline of two major imperial systems, the British and the French. During the span of one generation, the international distribution of power has been fundamentally altered. For several centuries it had proved impossible for any one nation to gain such preponderant strength that a coalition of other nations could not in time face it with greater strength. The international scene was marked by recurring periods of violence and war, but a system of sovereign independent states was maintained over which no state was able to achieve hegemony.*

The authors of NSC 68 point out that nuclear weapons have created a bipolar world. In this world

> *the Soviet Union, unlike previous aspirants to hegemony, is animated by a new fanatic faith, antithetical to our own, and seeks to impose its absolute authority over the rest of the world. Conflict has, therefore, become endemic and is waged, on the part of the Soviet Union, by violent or non-violent methods in accordance with the dictates of expediency. With the development of increasingly terrifying weapons of mass destruction, every individual faces the ever-present possibility of annihilation should the conflict enter the phase of total war. . . . The issues that face us are momentous, involving the fulfillment or destruction not only of this Republic but of civilization itself. They are issues which will not await our deliberations. With conscience and resolution this Government and the people it represents must now take new and fateful decisions.*

This was the view of the United States in 1950. NSC 68 was the basic policy docu-

ment. It is still the fundamental policy of the United States and our fundamental perception, a perception which is only now beginning to change under the promise of a possible difference in the Soviet Union. This mindset, this attitude, began and shaped the nature of secret government in the United States.

5

Interference with Foreign Governments

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The Pledge of Allegiance, which became the subject of much attention during the 1988 electoral campaign, ends with the vision of a republic which provides "liberty and justice for all." But in an increasingly interdependent world, it is important to think about how American actions can affect liberty and justice in other nations.

International relations have not always reflected these values. Despite the influence of the United Nations and the World Court, "the law of the jungle" might describe relationships between sovereign states. In this chapter, we explore ways that the United States government, acting through the CIA during the Eisenhower presidency, intervened secretly in foreign countries. Our government saw that of Iran in 1953 and Guatemala in 1954 as bodies standing in the way of American aims, and so covert operations were launched which overthrew both established governments. It is worth focusing on these two "successful" cases. If we can interfere secretly with legally established governments *and* get away with it, should we?

In this chapter, students should begin to develop their own understandings about what acceptable standards of international relationships might be. To prepare for this chapter, have students interview one another on this subject, using questions such as:

- Should the United States play a major role in the world? What does that mean?
- Under what types of circumstances should our government use its influence or power abroad? What's the difference between influence and power?
- Should our activities outside our borders be consistent with laws here in our country? Why or why not?
- How should the United States respond when another country makes a move of which we don't approve?
- Should the United Nations be used in international disputes? What should its role be?

A CASE STUDY: IRAN

John Foster Dulles, soon to be Secretary of State under President Dwight Eisenhower, wrote a draft for the Republican Party platform of 1952. Although these paragraphs did not appear in the final version of the platform, they reveal a great deal about the thinking of a man who would have great influence over foreign policy during the Eisenhower era. Dulles argued:

Republican Senator Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin set the tone for the 1952 election by questioning the loyalty and patriotism of many Democrats.

> *"We shall again make liberty into a beacon light of hope that will penetrate the dark places. It will mark the end of the negative, futile and immoral policy of 'containment' which abandons countless human beings to a despotic and godless terrorism which in Korea enables the rulers to forge the captives into a weapon of our destruction."*

Later in his draft, Dulles wrote

> *"The policies we espouse will revive the contagious, liberating influences which are inherent in freedom. They will inevitably set up strains and stresses within the captive world which will make the rulers impotent to continue in their monstrous ways and marks the beginning of the end." [quoted in Lloyd Gardner, Approaching Vietnam, (New York: Norton, 1988), p. 120]*

Dwight Eisenhower's election in 1952 ended twenty years of Democratic control in the White House. Republican Senator Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin set the tone for the 1952 election by questioning the loyalty and patriotism of many Democrats, and the Republican came into power promising to stop the expansion of the Soviet Union abroad and to wipe out communist sympathizers at home.

While Mossadegh was clearly not a Communist, some White House analysts felt that his policies were accomplishing as much for the Communist csuse as if he had been an agent of Moscow.

While Eisenhower did not want to get the United States involved in a major war to stop Communism, its containment remained his goal. Some of his supporters called for the rollback of Communism, but Eisenhower did not want to become involved in another war like Korea. But he also did not want to be seen as someone who was weak, who was "soft on communism." Covert action provided a solution to this dilemma. A secret paramilitary operation wasn't a war. If it failed, the President could deny any knowledge of what had happened. That was known as "plausible deniability." If it worked, it could accomplish all of the President's goals without large scale military commitment. The United States could publicly support the United Nations and the processes of open diplomacy, while the Central Intelligence Agency secretly carried out different policies aimed to bring foreign countries into line with the aims of the United States government.

The Eisenhower administration believed that they had won crucial foreign victories through covert action. The first of these victories was in Iran. The policies of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh caused concern in Washington. While Mossadegh was clearly not a Communist, some White House analysts felt that his policies were accomplishing as much for the Communist cause as if he had been an agent of Moscow. They felt that the Tudeh, the Communist Party of Iran, controlled Mossadegh; certainly, Mossadegh's rise had diminished the power of the Shah of Iran, who was a friend of the United States. The British were also at odds with Mossadegh; they were infuriated that Mossadegh had nationalized the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. The CIA and British intelligence therefore worked together to remove Mossadegh from office, and succeeded in doing so in 1953. Kermit Roosevelt, grandson of President Theodore Roosevelt and a cousin of President Franklin Roosevelt, organized the American effort in Iran. Operation Ajax, as it was called, was largely an exercise in crowd control. Roosevelt and his assistants, for example, used money to hire mobs to march through the streets (with huge Iranian weightlifters leading the way) demanding that the Shah be returned to office. Roosevelt's local sources — "assets" in CIA lingo — were effective. Roosevelt had assumed that if a showdown arose between Mossadegh and the Shah, the Iranian army would support the Shah. They did. The Shah later toasted Roosevelt with these words: "I owe my throne to God, my people, my army — and you." Roosevelt also received recognition from President Eisenhower, but, fittingly, he received it in secret. Operation Ajax had been a success. Few Americans knew of their country's behind-the-scenes management of the situation.

Roosevelt and his assistants used money to hire mobs to march through the streets demanding that the Shah be returned to office.

The American press described the Shah's return as a victory for the Iranian people. *Time*, for instance, titled its report "The People Take Over." *Time* was not a fan of Mossadegh. Although *Time* chose Mohammed Mossadegh as its "Man of the Year" in January, 1952, the caption under his picture read "He oiled the wheels of chaos."

In the article that follows, *Time* recounted the story of Mossadegh's fall, emphasizing the strong public displays of support for the Shah during the height of the showdown with Mossadegh. As we now know, many of these displays were orchestrated by the CIA.

The second reading in this section offers the words of Kermit Roosevelt himself. This excerpt, from Roosevelt's memoir *Countercoup*, explains how this Iranian plan came about. Roosevelt recounts his proposal to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, describing the balance of forces in Iran and outlining the general strategy for returning the Shah to power.

The third reading in this section is taken from the 1988 Tufts University symposium on covert action. At the conference, Professor Barry Rubin, a Fellow of the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Study and the Director of the Program for Political Study of Terrorism, spoke about the overthrow of Prime Minister Mossadegh. Rubin's version of events differed

from those presented by *Time* and Kermit Roosevelt. Rubin emphasized the complexity of the situation in Iran in 1953, and indicated that the full story of the coup has still not yet been revealed. Despite his in-depth understanding of the situation thirty-five years after the event, Rubin was still not sure whether the United States should have helped the Shah defeat Mossadegh.

Have students compare the accounts offered by *Time* and by Kermit Roosevelt of the return of the Shah to power. Where do these accounts agree? Where do they disagree? What do these accounts suggest about the difficulties of reporting about covert action? Then ask students to explore Professor Rubin's account. Does his analysis tend to support *Time*'s version of events or Roosevelt's? What were Rubin's conclusions?

THE PEOPLE TAKE OVER

Time (August 31, 1953)

The violent, hot land of Iran last week headed uncontrollably over the crumbling edge of the abyss, and then, during three wild days, pulled itself back to safety.

When the week began, Mohammed Mossadegh seemed safely on top. The Shah was in flight; the fanatic mullahs' and the stubborn Majlis' opposition was hidden or cowed; the army was a sullen eunuch; the world resigned. Who was there to say him no?

His street supporters celebrated with a carnival of destruction. Communist and Nationalist mobs swarmed deliriously over Teheran's principal squares, pulling down the great bronze statues of the Shah and his father. They opened and defiled the Reza Shah's tomb, spat on the Shah's picture, applauded as Foreign Minister Hussein Fatemi cried: "To the gallows" with the young Shah.

The Ambassador's Call.

At sundown of the second day, wily old Mossadegh seemed to have all Teheran in his hand. But something was stirring in Teheran that could not yet be measured. Perhaps Mossadegh, unopposed, had gone too far and too fast and frightened the people. Perhaps the Shah's flight forced them at last to decide between monarch and Premier.

Precisely at 6 p.m., U.S. Ambasador Loy Henderson (back the previous day from two months' vacation) mounted the stairs to Mossadegh's bedroom at 109 Kakh Street. Henderson stayed one hour; soon after he left, things began to happen.

What went on up in Mossadegh's bedroom? Henderson began by protesting the stoning of six U.S. citizens' cars that day, and asked assurances that U.S. lives and property would be protected. Otherwise, he would order all American women and children evacuated. That startled Mossadegh. Then the ambassador inquired politely about the legal validity of Mossadegh's regime in view of the Shah's parting decree, in which he fired Mossadegh and named General Fazollah Zahedi in his place. When Henderson quit the room, Mossadegh was firmly convinced that the U.S. was undecided whether to continue to recognize him as Iran's Premier.

Happy to Oblige.

Apparently this fitted together with other doubts and misgivings that were gathering in Mossadegh's mind. Shaken, the old man went to the phone and ordered his army and police to drive the rioting Reds off the street. That call, turning the army loose on the most powerful street support he had, was Mossadegh's fatal mistake. The troops were only too happy to oblige; they clubbed the rioters unmercifully and punctuated their thudding gun butts with shouts of "Long live the Shah" and "Death to traitors." Growing bolder, they forced the Reds at bayonet point to cheer the Shah, too. The next morning, the bruised and bitter Tudeh Central Committee proclaimed: "No more aid to Mossadegh, who is a compromising traitor," and the Reds retreated into hiding. He had disappointed them: Mossadegh in their eyes was to have been the Kerensky who preceded them to power. Now, suddenly, their fortunes had changed.

The third day was the people's day. The shabbily dressed poor poured out of their south Teheran slums, chanting, "Long live the Shah." Others, armed with knives and

clubs, joined them. Shopkeepers pulled down the shutters in front of their stores and swelled the march. Ordered to stop the parades, the soldiers turned, instead, on their officers. Eight truckloads of troops and five tanks, dispatched to the city to help Mossadegh, turned over their equipment to the first pro-Shah mob they met.

Flanked now by soldiers, the mob began a nine-hour-long assault on one Mossadegh stronghold after another. When they finished, they had captured the police station and Radio Teheran; they had sacked eight government buildings and two pro-Mossadegh newspaper plants; they had smashed the headquarters of the Tudeh and the pro-Mossadegh Pan-Iranian party.

This was no military coup, but a spontaneous popular uprising; individual soldiers joined, but not a single army unit came in. Not until 4 p.m., when an air force general appeared before General Zahedi's hideout with a tank, did Zahedi emerge and take command of a field already won. The General-Premier and his officers were as surprised by the victory as the people themselves. The army had planned to counterattack Mossadegh on Friday; the people beat them to it by two days.

THE STRUGGLE FOR THE CONTROL OF IRAN

by Kermit Roosevelt, (excerpt from *Countercoup*)

"Sir," I began, "we have, as you know, studied this situation very thoroughly. You remember that the British first approached us before the election, before President Eisenhower and you were in office. Naturally, the British have been primarily concerned with their oil problem, while our concern has been principally the Soviet threat to Iranian sovereignty. On Mr. Allen Dulles' instructions I have been to Iran several times to make assessments. The last two times have been since the election. I would say that we are now satisfied about the major questions that concerned us. First, the Soviet threat is indeed genuine, dangerous and imminent. At this moment, time seems to favor the Russians and their unwitting ally, Dr. Mossadegh. My second point seems almost contradictory, but I am equally convinced about it. That is, in a showdown that is clearly recognizable as a showdown, the Iranian army and the Iranian people will back the Shah. They will back him against Mossadegh and, most especially, against the Russians. To my mind there is no doubt about that.

"So we are now asking your approval to move ahead. As you do know, we have British approval. As soon as we have yours, we can communicate with the Shah himself, which we have not felt free to do as long as we lacked the final U.S. go-ahead. We hope we will have that this morning."

"Let me now summarize the way we view this undertaking. From the outset I should make it plain that what we have is no more than a projection of what might happen. We do know that the Shah wishes to replace Dr. Mossadegh. But we have not yet felt able to confer with him. There is no way of foretelling in advance how things will develop, so what we really offer now is an objective, a hope, a goal. This paper outlines one possible course to that goal. We do feel confident that we can achieve it, but we do not wish to mislead you into believing that, as of now, we can tell you exactly how.

"One point is central: This can only be a *joint* undertaking, with the fullest cooperation from Iranians under the confident, enthusiastic leadership of the Shah himself. Unless we can achieve such understanding, such commonality of purpose, the success we and the British seek can never be achieved. The British cannot work in Iran at all, and it would be fruitless for us to try to work alone. Everything I say from here on is based upon the achievement of a trust and a true working alliance between the Iranians and ourselves, with the British contributing as much support as they can.

"The first objective naturally is, with the Shah's backing, to organize the military support. We would propose to contact carefully selected army leaders. I repeat, 'carefully selected.' The present chief of staff, General Riahi, is a key supporter of Mossadegh. We are not exactly sure how many of his subordinates have also shifted their loyalty from their proper Commander in Chief, who is by law the Shah himself. There are, of course, some. But in the showdown we are seeking, very, very few would cling to Mossadegh and Riahi against His Imperial Majesty.

"On the question of Mossadegh's

(NY: McGraw-Hill, 1981), pp 11-13

replacement, we have had strong indications that the Shah's choice is General Fazlollah Zahedi. The British have reservations about him. That is putting it mildly, for they held him a prisoner in Palestine during World War Two. But we know and trust him. Zahedi is presently in hiding after Mossadegh attempted to have him arrested. His son, Ardeshir, is a young man well known to some of our embassy personnel. They have complete confidence in him. He is brave and absolutely loyal, not only to his father but to the Shah as well. He will be an invaluable, completely reliable contact with the general.

"There are other officers and civilians who can play important roles. These are men in whom we, the Shah and our British friends who will be watching and helping from afar have complete confidence. If we get approval from you now, the next step will be to get the Shah's agreement. After that we will work with him to line up sufficient strength for him to act. Once he dismisses Mossadegh from office and names Zahedi to take his place, there must be prompt support for his action. Together we must organize the necessary military and popular backing which will make any resistance from Mossadegh and his ally, General Riahi, absolutely hopeless. And if that can be done, the Russians also will find it hopeless — impossible to intervene.

THE UNITED STATES AND MOSSADEGH

Barry Rubin, Tufts University symposium (excerpt)

I think I'm the only outside person who has seen the files of the American embassy in Teheran for '51 to '53. . . . I looked at them during the hostage crisis, and when . . . it was realized this might be controversial, they were reclassified and pulled back. Unfortunately, I didn't xerox them. . . . What do these documents show? They show something fascinating. They show that all through '52 and '53 the leaders of every single political faction in Iran were coming to the U.S. embassy and were saying, "We are sick of Mossadegh. We want your help to overthrow him, and we want to be in power." The Iranians were soliciting covert operations. Now, for two years, the United States supported Mossadegh. The United States pressed Britain to compromise with the Mossadegh government. The United States supplied aid to Mossadegh. At the end of those two years, three things happened. . . . First of all, the Americans were disillusioned. Unfortunately, . . . Mossadegh was a very nice and well-intentioned man, but he was a total political incompetent. He was incapable of ruling the country. He did not have a strong base of support. . . . The Americans were disillusioned with their attempts to get Mossadegh to compromise with the British. A lot of this was the fault of the British, too. [But] obviously, if the U.S. had to choose between the British and Mossadegh, they were going to choose the British. . . . The second point is that there was a new administration in Washington. Truman had gone out, Eisenhower had come in. Different American administrations have different attitudes toward covert operations and different interpretations of world problems. . . . The third point is, the Mossadegh government was on the verge of collapse and probably wouldn't have lasted many more months. . . . Should the U.S. have been involved in this covert operation in August '53? I don't know. . . . but it wasn't a crazy, irrational, evil, monstrous, imperialistic thing. It was a response to a real situation. It was a judgment.

A CASE STUDY: GUATEMALA

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and his brother, Allen Welch Dulles, the Director of Central Intelligence, were impressed by Operation Ajax. They invited Kermit Roosevelt to lead another operation, this time in Guatemala. Roosevelt declined, for he believed that the situations were not analogous and that the CIA did not have the assets to make the proposed operation work. However, the United States did sponsor a major and successful covert action in Guatemala in 1954.

The legally elected President of Guatemala, Jacobo Arbenz Guzman, offered reforms that challenged the largest economic interests in his country, just as Mossadegh had done in Iran. This time, an American institution was under fire — the United Fruit Company. When United Fruit found a great deal of its property nationalized as a result of Arbenz's land reform policies, the company complained to the United States government. John Foster Dulles, a former lawyer for United Fruit, was sympathetic to United Fruit's plight, and so initiated covert operations to aid the company. Once again a prospective native leader was found — Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas — and an American-sponsored campaign against Arbenz was launched. More than mobs in the street were needed this time. The CIA helped organize a guerilla army, a secret air force, and a clandestine radio station, even broadcasting faked news reports of battles and uprisings in its effort to aid Armas. Arbenz fled, and the CIA and the Eisenhower Administration rejoiced in the triumph of its aptly named "Operation Success."

When United Fruit found a great deal of its property nationalized as a result of Arbenz's land reform policies, the company complained to the United States government.

Buoyed by the relative ease of this operation, the Eisenhower Administration attempted other interventions which it hoped would produce similar results. All over the globe, the CIA offered support to those people who shared Washington's view of the world. The CIA supported Gen. Li Mi of Burma and urged him to attack Mao Zedong's government. Financial and military aid was funnelled to enemies of Mao in Tibet. In Indonesia, the CIA supported Sumatran rebels in 1958 in a revolt against President Sukarno, who had angered the United States by his neutralist stance. (Dulles did not believe that neutrality was a legitimate position in the Cold War. He demanded that nations take sides; neutrality was interpreted as opposition to American interests.) While these endeavors failed, the number of clandestine interventions undertaken indicated the enthusiasm with which the Eisenhower Administration viewed the opportunities presented by covert action and "plausible deniability."

Just as it did in Iran, the United States' role in this coup in Guatemala went unreported. *Time*'s 1954 coverage of these events portrays the United States acting *diplomatically* to help settle the tumultuous affairs in Guatemala, but there was no recognition of the intensity of American involvement. Following is the July 5, 1954, *Time* story describing the final day of the Arbenz government.

After discussing this reading with students, ask them to compare the Iranian and Guatemalan case histories introduced here. What were our reasons for encouraging the overthrow of those governments? What were the goals for the new governments? Have these goals been achieved? Have students research the governments of Guatemala and Iran today. What are their relationships with the United States? Are they democratic? Evaluate with students the effects of Operation Ajax and Operation Success upon these countries.

"EXIT THE COLONEL, COMPLAINING"

Time (July 5, 1954)

Arbenz is out. This week Guatemala, after four years of skidding toward the Soviet orbit and ten days of bombing and strafing by anti-Communist rebel invaders, found its President's Marxism and his Communist kibitzers too much. Top army officers forced him to quit, and took power with a junta of three colonels. Arbenz flew off to exile in Buenos Aires.

The military assault that led to Colonel Arbenz' downfall was hardly a firecracker pop by modern standards. It consisted mainly of a miniature air war, waged by four obsolete rebel planes. They worked so effectively that the 2,000 tons of Communist infantry weapons that Arbenz imported last month were worthless —and he had no fighter planes of his own. As fear and tension grew in Guatemala, it became plain that the Communist jig was up.

By Sunday morning of this week there were plain signs of defection in the army and the cabinet. Foreign Minister Guillermo Toriello called in U.S. Ambassador John Peurifoy, sought to see what could be saved, and offered to resign. Peurifoy's diplomatic answer was that he would certainly like to see the bloodshed end. He was barely back at his embassy when the phone rang again. It was Colonel Carlos Enrique Diaz, chief of the armed forces. Would the Ambassador come to his house for an urgent conference?

Farewell Address.

Through deserted, shuttered streets went Peurifoy. Five top-ranking colonels were there, and they wanted to know whether the U.S. Ambassador would recognize a junta headed by Diaz, and help stop the fighting. What Peurifoy had to say, in the 2¼-hour talk, was not reported. But at the end Diaz and two other officers went to give Arbenz the word. The President, forced to bow for the first time in his stubborn life, burst into a rage, stormed and argued. Finally he acceded, and went on the radio for a bitter farewell in an unsteady voice breaking with emotion.

"I have made the momentous decision," he said, "to abandon the presidency. I leave power in the able hands of Colonel Diaz. I urge all revolutionary organizations to support him. I hope this decision will save the revolution."

Doctrinaire to the end, he charged that the United Fruit Co. of Boston (which lost 400,000 acres of land to Arbenz' agrarian reform program) had "tried to destroy our country" under the pretext of attacking Communism. He referred sorrowfully to the "overwhelming and tremendous means at the command of Guatemala's enemies," and signed off.

Diaz followed, crediting Arbenz with doing "what he though was his duty," and promising to preserve the social reforms of his regime. Like Arbenz and Rebel Castillo Armas, Diaz is a professional officer; the three were schoolmates at Guatemala's military academy. He is 40, popular in the army and among the people, less provincial than the narrow, little-traveled Arbenz. Last year he publicly declared: "There will be no Communists in the officers' corps while I am in command." He supported Arbenz from duty and in the belief that Arbenz' land reform was good; there was nothing to prove that he saw Red influence over the President as a critical problem. But his first acts in power were to 1) form a three-man junta that included a vocal anti-Communist, 2) out-

law the Communist Party and 3) fire Colonel Rogelio Cruz Wer, head of Guatemala's notorious police and the Reds' only important sympathizer of high military rank.

Diplomatic Front.

Arbenz' ouster complicated diplomatic efforts to deal with the civil war and — more widely — with Guatemala's drift toward becoming a Russian satellite in the U.S.'s backyard. In the U.N. last week Russian and Guatemalan delegates had struggled to make any investigation of the war a Security Council matter — Russia doubtless relishing the potentialities for propaganda and mischief. But the U.S. point of view — that ending the war was a task for the Organization of American States — prevailed. The OAS promptly voted to hold a foreign ministers' meeting in Rio de Janeiro July 7. An investigating mission made ready to fly to Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua.

Until the diplomatic machinery had time to work, any prospect of speedy peace was left squarely up to Diaz and Castillo Armas, with the U.S.'s Peurifoy to lend his good offices for a cease-fire. Diaz and his fellow colonels, in hastening to take an anti-Communist stand, obviously hoped to take a lot of the fire out of the rebels' anti-Red crusade. Diaz announced that the "struggle against the mercenary invaders of Guatemala will not abate," and went on uncrating his new Iron-Curtain shooting irons. But Castillo Armas, after a slow start, had already toppled his major target, and now had momentum as well as his deadly planes. His radio cried that Diaz was simply the "mask behind which the Communists are now operating." He warned of tougher air raids to come. If the peacemakers failed, the war could yet be bloody.

What It Was Like

Right up to the dramatic climax of President Arbenz' forced resignation, the war in Guatemala was a strange, onesided air war, fought by three mysterious F-47 Thunderbolts and an absurd little Cessna sports plane, all under the command of the leader of the anti-Communist rebels, Colonel Castillo Armas.

The F-47s, probably operating from Nicaragua, functioned as a strategic air force, doing the relatively heavy jobs. For two days they bombed and strafed Chiquimula, a provincial capital (pop. 9,000) at the south end of the 130-mile front paralleling the Honduran border. After that Castillo Armas' guerrillas walked in, took the town without resistance, established headquarters, and set up a provisional government.

Tactical Air.

The Cessna, at times flying so low it scratched its belly on the treetops, was the rebels' tactical air force. It dropped anti-personnel grenades on the city of Zacapa, and the government began evacuating civilians. A Thunderbolt worked over a troop train near by and stopped it. Soldiers leaped from the cars and melted into the countryside; some of them reportedly went over to the rebels. In Guatemala City, meanwhile, F-47s poured bullets into the vitally needed Shell gasoline storage tanks, and 40,000 gallons squirted out. One of the five forts that guard the capital was bombed and set on fire. Arbenz' emphasis, in his radio talk, on how much the air attacks had hurt, was an eloquent restatement of an old principle: in air war, as in poker, a low hand can win the biggest pot when the opponents hold nothing at all.

On the ground, meanwhile, a few U.S. newsmen managed to get a quick look at

the rebel army — 2,000-odd Indian-faced peasants, no two dressed alike but most of them wearing blue armbands with the white dagger and cross of the "Liberation Movement." They fingered black burp guns and seemed to have plenty of ammunition. The officers were upper-crust Guatemalan exiles — lawyers, engineers, coffee planters driven out for their politics or stripped of some of their land under Arbenz' Communist-administered agrarian reform program. Castillo Armas himself turned out to be a slender, sallow, diffident man in a checked shirt and leather jacket, with a .45 automatic jammed into the belt of his khaki pants.

Strategic Aim.

The rebel leader at first seemed cold and reserved, but he warmed up in a hurry when asked about his objectives. "Primarily," he answered, "to throw Communism out of Guatemala . . . All the Guatemalan people are anxious for our arrival. But we must be prepared for every action of the enemy. Communism is not a good enemy! It is one of the worst enemies we can have in life!" As the words poured out, his eyes caught fire and his voice rang.

If the weekend mood at rebel headquarters was dedication, the mood in Guatemala City was depression. Food supplies were running short and prices were rising. Police were everywhere. Fear and distrust were in the air. Even high-ranking officers carried submachine guns in their own offices.

A different sort of fear blanketed the countryside — fear of the peasant bands and Communist partisans whom the government had called out to patrol roads, to search houses and arrest anti-Communists and other "traitors." Many of these barefoot supporters of the Arbenz regime obviously knew as little of Marx as they did of Hart & Schaffner, but many of them had got land under the agrarian program, and they could be counted on to defend it ferociously. Men like that who get weapons in their hands do not turn them back meekly; Guatemala would probably hear of them again.

THE DOOLITTLE REPORT

NSC #68 provided the broad picture of the world, but other reports were needed to decide in detail what to do about it. Covert operations which accomplished their goals, of course, spoke louder than words. Thus following Operations Ajax and Success, President Eisenhower appointed Lieutenant General James Doolittle to study these CIA actions. His "Report on the Covert Activities of the Central Intelligence Agency" was completed at the end of September 1954. This report praised the CIA's recent accomplishments, and indicated, in no uncertain terms, why such actions were necessary. According to Doolittle, the game of international relations was not played according to the rules of gentlemen. Tough measures were needed in times of crisis, and the Cold War was such a crisis.

Have students discuss the assumptions embedded within the following short excerpt from the report. What does Doolittle assume about the United States? The Soviet Union? About the proper conduct of foreign policy? About the exercise of power? Discuss with students their views on these assumptions.

It may also be a good time for students to begin to formulate a definition of covert action. The concept is difficult to describe.

At the Tufts conference on covert action, many of the speakers disagreed on such a definition. Douglas Blaufarb, a former CIA officer, said that "covert action operations are secret operations conducted to achieve policy aims of the United States government." Noam Chomsky, a leading critic of American foreign policy, countered that "covert operations are typically acts of international terrorism or aggression . . . that are concealed by the media and the Congress."

You may want to use these definitions, or have the class create their own. Ask the class to compare the two case histories here against these definitions. Where does the operation against Mossadegh fit? What about the one against Arbenz? The issue comes down to this: Is covert action a form of terrorism by the state? Why? Is it different? How?

REPORT ON THE COVERT ACTIVITIES OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

by James Doolittle (the "Doolittle Report")

Because the United States is relatively new at the game, and because we are opposed by a police state enemy whose social discipline and security measures have been built up and maintained at a high level for many years, the usable information we are obtaining is still far short of our needs.

As long as it remains national policy, another important requirement is an aggressive covert psychological, political and paramilitary organization more effective, more unique and, if necessary, more ruthless than that employed by the enemy. No one should be allowed to stand in the way of the prompt, efficient and secure establishment of this mission . . .

It is now clear that we are facing an implacable enemy whose avowed objective is world domination by whatever means and at whatever cost. There are no rules in such a game. Hitherto acceptable norms of human conduct do not apply. If the United States is to survive, long-standing American concepts of "fair play" must be reconsidered. We must develop effective espionage and counter-espionage services and must learn to subvert, sabotage and destroy our enemies by more clever, more sophisticated and more effective methods than those used against us. It may become necessary that the American people be made acquainted with, understand and support this fundamentally repugnant philosophy

6

Secrecy and National Security

NATIONAL SECURITY

It is said that it is our democratic system that makes the United States different from other countries in the world. Although definitions of democracy differ, most emphasize individual liberty and popular control of government. In our country, citizens elect representatives, senators, and a president directly. These officials are supposed to be responsive to and *responsible* to the citizenry. Consequently, it is said, the public has the right and the duty to examine the actions of government officials.

This system works beautifully in the civics books, but what can be said about this system in reality? Particularly, how does covert action alter the picture sketched above? Can the citizens of the United States judge the job their government is doing if that government doesn't make its activities public? Where is the line between disclosure and secrecy? Governments often keep things secret due to "national security." How narrowly or broadly should that be defined? If foreign policy is to be effective, don't some aspects have to be kept secret?

Can the citizens of the United States judge the job their government is doing if that government doesn't make its activities public?

This chapter will provide two case studies of covert action, one from the 1960s and one from the 1970s. Unlike the case studies in the previous chapter, both of these plans were failures. Also, those who organized these actions failed to keep them secret. Throughout this chapter, teachers will want to raise questions about the issue of failure. Did mere circumstance create these failures, or were the assumptions of the actions themselves at fault? Can secret interventions really be kept secret? How far should the government go in keeping them secret? From whom and for whom were these actions being kept secret?

It might be effective to invite several local officials to class to discuss their experiences with secrecy. Do they think there is a tension between the need for security and the public's right to know?

This would also be a good time to discuss with students the concept of "security." Write the term on the board and list as many different forms of security as they can imagine. "Brainstorm" with students to explore all the denotations and connotations of this word.

CASE STUDY: THE BAY OF PIGS

John F. Kennedy believed that the world was a competitive place, and that the United States had to continue to prove its fitness on the international stage. In fact, the major subject of Kennedy's inaugural address was foreign affairs. The young chief executive pledged an activist role in world affairs; the United States would work for its ideals all over the globe. The President came up with some new initiatives to achieve this goal: A Peace Corps was created for Americans who wanted to serve the world and help those less fortunate than themselves. A new counterinsurgency force — the Green Berets — provided a military counterpart to the Peace Corps — a War Corps, as it were. Both of these organizations could be useful in the struggle for the hearts and minds of emerging nations.

Kennedy sustained the Cold War ideology of the previous administration. Plans for covert operations had been started by Eisenhower at the end of his term, and Kennedy continued work on these plans. He became particularly interested in plans concerning Cuba, ninety miles from the United States. Operation Pluto, a covert operation run by the CIA, aimed to overthrow Fidel Castro's government in Cuba, was nearly ready to go. Cuban refugees, trained, funded, and equipped by the United States, were preparing to invade that island. Planners hoped, despite intelligence reports to the contrary, that the invasion would spark an internal uprising which, aided by the United States, would remove both Castro and Soviet influence from the Western Hemisphere.

Planners hoped that the invasion would remove both Castro and Soviet influence from the Western Hemisphere.

By the time Kennedy became president, Americans were already training these exiles in Guatemala. The Nicaraguan dictator Somoza had set up an air force to aid the invasion. The basic plan of the invasion had already been determined. The United States would transport the Cuban refugees to their landing zone within Cuba, where the refugees would declare a provisional government; within a few days the United States would recognize this provisional government, and then aid it openly in a military struggle against Castro. President Kennedy needed to decide, in a matter of weeks after assuming office, whether to continue with this plan, and if so, where the invasion should take place, whether Americans would take part in the invasion itself, and whether the United States would bail out the invaders in the event of their failure.

Kennedy agonized over all of these decisions. Some of his advisors were skeptical, but many urged him forward, including Allen Dulles, still the director

of Central Intelligence and a man whom Kennedy saw as a legend in the field, and Richard Bissell, the major architect of the CIA's plan. Brigade 2506 (as the invasion force was named) was a top-notch military machine, it was said, and eager for action. The lure of covert action proved too great to resist.

The invading force was not large — 1400 men — but it was also too big to hide. American newspaper articles months earlier and again ten days before the April 1961 invasion had reported that United States officials and Cuban refugees were involved in joint training programs.

Planners of the invasion counted on Cubans sympathetic to the invaders rising at once and creating chaos within the country. They selected the isolated Bay of Pigs as the invasion site because its swampy environs cut down the need for a large force and for air cover. As a contingency, they planned that members of Brigade 2506 could cut through the swamps to the mountains and become guerrillas if the attack failed.

While this was not the first covert action to fail, it was the first *public* failure, creating great consternation within both the CIA and the Kennedy Administration.

Nothing went right. The 1400 invaders found themselves face to face with 20,000 well-trained Cuban soldiers. No direct U.S. military help was permitted. The lack of air cover was devastating. The mountains to which the invaders were to flee were eighty miles away. 114 invaders died and 1189 were captured. It was a fiasco.

The Bay of Pigs invasion paid no dividends. The United States' role was acknowledged almost immediately after the collapse of the invasion. While this was not the first covert action to fail, it was the first *public* failure, creating great consternation within both the CIA and the Kennedy Administration. Allen Dulles' tenure as the director of Central Intelligence ended soon thereafter, and Richard Bissell, once his heir apparent, did not take over this position.

Despite this fiasco, the Kennedy Administration and the CIA, now under the leadership of John McCone, continued efforts to disrupt and even eliminate Castro's influence in the Western Hemisphere. "Operation Mongoose," as it was called, can properly be described as a vendetta against the Cuban leader; it included everything from pesky acts of sabotage, such as blowing up lighthouses, to at least eight attempts to assassinate Castro. Some of those efforts were planned in conjunction with Mafia leaders in the United States who were still angry that Havana was no longer one of their fiefdoms.

The first reading in this section is John F. Kennedy's inaugural address, one of the most memorable ever given. Have students study this address, and discuss Kennedy's pronouncements here about American foreign policy. What are Kennedy's assumptions about the role and responsibilities of our government? What are Kennedy's assumptions about the other nations of the world?

The second reading is from the front page of the April 7, 1961, edition of the *New York Times*. This report, by Tad Szulc, describes U.S. training of anti-Castro rebels. The invasion had been discovered even before it began.

Besides having students examine this report, you may want to have students

find and review a variety of 1961 press reports about the Bay of Pigs invasion. Have students research such reports in *Time, Newsweek, U.S. News and World Report, National Review, The Nation, The New Republic,* and local newspapers.

What was similar about their coverage? What was different? Did editorial judgments appear in the news descriptions? Did the news sources also publish editorials on the invasion? Who wrote them? What did these editorials say?

After students have discussed these reports, have them undertake a discussion about the propriety of the invasion. You may want to set up a role-playing situation, with one student as president, and other students as advisors to the president.

Beforehand, work with students to create a list of positions that various students can represent. This list might include the following:

- Castro is a Communist and a threat, and must be deposed by any means.
- If the United States wants to overthrow Castro, a conventional military force should be used.
- The United States has no right to intervene in Cuban affairs under any circumstances.
- A covert operation is a good idea, but it must have wide support.
- The Cuban exiles should be given responsibility for the entire operation.

JOHN F. KENNEDY INAUGURAL ADDRESS

January 20, 1961

We observe today not a victory of party but a celebration of freedom — symbolizing an end as well as a beginning — signifying renewal as well as change. For I have sworn before you and Almighty God the same solemn oath our forebears prescribed nearly a century and three quarters ago.

The world is very different now. For man holds in his mortal hands the power to abolish all forms of human poverty and all forms of human life. And yet the same revolutionary beliefs for which our forebears fought are still at issue around the globe — the belief that the rights of man come not from the generosity of the state but from the hand of God.

We dare not forget today that we are the heirs of that first revolution. Let the word go forth from this time and place, to friend and foe alike, that the torch has been passed to a new generation of Americans — born in this century, tempered by war, disciplined by a hard and bitter peace, proud of our ancient heritage — and unwilling to witness or permit the slow undoing of those human rights to which this nation has always been committed, and to which we are committed today at home and around the world.

Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and success of liberty.

This much we pledge — and more.

To those old allies whose cultural and spiritual origins we share, we pledge the loyalty of faithful friends. United, there is little we cannot do in a host of cooperative ventures. Divided, there is little we can do — for we dare not meet a powerful challenge at odds and split asunder.

To those new states whom we welcome to the ranks of the free, we pledge our word that one form of colonial control shall not have passed away merely to be replaced by a far more iron tyranny. We shall not always expect to find them supporting our view. But we shall always hope to find them strongly supporting their own freedom — and to remember that, in the past, those who foolishly sought power by riding the back of the tiger ended up inside.

To those peoples in the huts and villages of half the globe struggling to break the bonds of mass misery, we pledge our best efforts to help them help themselves, for whatever period is required — not because the communists may be doing it, not because we seek their votes, but because it is right. If a free society cannot help the many who are poor, it cannot save the few who are rich.

To our sister republics south of our border, we offer a special pledge — to convert our good words into good deeds — in a new alliance for progress — to assist free men and free governments in casting off the chains of poverty. But this peaceful revolution of hope cannot become the prey of hostile powers. Let all our neighbors know that we shall join with them to oppose aggression or subversion anywhere in the Americas. And let every other power know that this Hemisphere intends to remain the master of its own house.

To that world assembly of sovereign states, the United Nations, our last best hope in an age where the instruments of war have far outpaced the instruments of

peace, we renew our pledge of support — to prevent it from becoming merely a forum for invective — to strengthen its shield of the new and the weak — and to enlarge the area in which its writ may run.

Finally, to those nations who would make themselves our adversary, we offer not a pledge but a request: that both sides begin anew the quest for peace, before the dark powers of destruction unleashed by science engulf all humanity in planned or accidental self-destruction.

We dare not tempt them with weakness. For only when our arms are sufficient beyond doubt can we be certain beyond doubt that they will never be employed.

But neither can two great and powerful groups of nations take comfort from our present course — both sides overburdened by the cost of modern weapons, both rightly alarmed by the steady spread of the deadly atom, yet both racing to alter that uncertain balance of terror that stays the hand of mankind's final war.

So let us begin anew — remembering on both sides that civility is not a sign of weakness, and sincerity is always subject to proof. Let us never negotiate out of fear. But let us never fear to negotiate.

Let both sides explore what problems unite us instead of belaboring those problems which divide us.

Let both sides, for the first time, formulate serious and precise proposals for the inspection and control of arms — and bring the absolute power to destroy other nations under the absolute control of all nations.

Let both sides seek to invoke the wonders of science instead of its terrors. Together let us explore the stars, conquer the deserts, eradicate disease, tap the ocean depths and encourage the arts and commerce.

Let both sides unite to heed in all corners of the earth the command of Isaiah — to "undo the heavy burdens . . . (and) let the oppressed go free."

And if a beach-head of cooperation may push back the jungle of suspicion, let both sides join in creating a new endeavor, not a new balance of power, but a new world of law, where the strong are just and the weak secure and the peace preserved.

All this will not be finished in the first one hundred days. Nor will it be finished in the first one thousand days, nor in the life of this Administration, nor even perhaps in our lifetime on this planet. But let us begin.

In your hands, my fellow citizens, more than mine, will rest the final success or failure of our course. Since this country was founded, each generation of Americans has been summoned to give testimony to its national loyalty. The graves of young Americans who answered the call to service surround the globe.

Now the trumpet summons us again — not as a call to bear arms, though arms we need — not as a call to battle, though embattled we are — but a call to bear the burden of a long twilight struggle, year in and year out, "rejoicing in hope, patient in tribulation" — a struggle against the common enemies of man: tyranny, poverty, disease and war itself.

Can we forge against these enemies a grand and global alliance, North and South, East and West, that can assure a more fruitful life for all mankind? Will you join in that historic effort?

In the long history of the world, only a few generations have been granted the role of defending freedom in its hour of maximum danger. I do not shrink from this responsibility — I welcome it. I do not believe that any of us would exchange places with any other people or any other

generation. The energy, the faith, the devotion which we bring to this endeavor will light our country and all who serve it — and the glow from that fire can truly light the world.

And so, my fellow Americans: ask not what your country can do for you — ask what you can do for your country.

My fellow citizens of the world: ask not what America will do for you, but what together we can do for the freedom of man.

Finally, whether you are citizens of America or citizens of the world, ask of us here the same high standards of strength and sacrifice which we ask of you. With a good conscience our only sure reward, with history the final judge of our deeds, let us go forth to lead the land we love, asking His blessing and His help, but knowing that here on earth God's work must truly be our own.

ANTI-CASTRO UNITS TRAINED TO FIGHT AT FLORIDA BASES

by Tad Szulc, *New York Times* (April 7, 1961)

Force There and in Central America Is Reported to Total 5,000 to 6,000

MIAMI, Fla., April 6 — For nearly nine months Cuban exile military forces dedicated to the overthrow of Premier Fidel Castro have been training in the United States as well as in Central America.

An army of 5,000 to 6,000 men constitutes the external fighting arm of the anti-Castro Revolutionary Council, which was formed in the United States last month. Its purpose is the liberation of Cuba from what it describes as the Communist rule of the Castro regime.

Many of those in the exile forces were companions of Dr. Castro in his revolution against the Batista regime.

Within Cuba, the Revolutionary Council counts on an evergrowing underground network engaged in organizing guerrillas, carrying out sabotage and gathering intelligence.

Cuban leaders here expect that it will be possible to coordinate the activities of the external forces — those trained outside Cuba — and the internal forces when the time comes for a major move against the Castro fortress in Cuba.

Recruiting Ended

The recruiting of Cubans which has been proceeding since last summer, is being discontinued as the anti-Castro leaders believe that their external forces have reached the stage of adequate preparation.

The external forces, many of them highly trained in landing, infiltration and sabotage operations are now concentrated at two major camps in Guatemala and at a base in Louisiana, not far from New Orleans.

This latest Cuban revolutionary army is reported by its leaders to include an air force, a navy and paratrooper units.

It is supported by commando-type groups of infiltrators, saboteurs and guerrilla specialists who have been landing in Cuba for months from hidden bases in the Florida Keys in cooperation with the growing underground on the island.

Most of the instruction given to the anti-Castro forces was reported to have been centered in the Guatemalan camps where infantry and artillery units are being trained by United States experts.

But special instruction has been available in small camps in Florida.

Reports said that some of the air and paratroop units are in the Louisiana camps.

In the initial stages of the training that began last summer, groups were instructed in drill and the use of arms by individual Cuban organizations. Since last fall the training has been centralized under the direction of a united Cuban political command.

This command was the Democratic Revolutionary Front, originally formed by five anti-Castro groups. It has enjoyed the tolerance and the active cooperation of United States officials.

Opponents United

The front was organized in Miami late in the spring of 1960 as the principal anti-Castro organization. Last month it was absorbed into the Revolutionary Council formed to unite all the factions opposed to the Castro regime and to any resurgence of a Batista-type dictatorship.

Until the signing of the unity pact last month and the establishment of the Revo-

lutionary Council under Dr. José Miró Cardona, the military units of the Democratic Front operated separately from the groups of the Peoples' Revolutionary Movement headed by Manuel Ray, Dr. Castro's former Minister of Public Works.

The Ray movement is the foremost underground organization in Cuba, but it also has small military groups in the United States.

After the unity pact brought together the Democratic Front and the Peoples' Revolutionary Movement under the leadership of Dr. Miró Cardona, the Ray organization instructed its members to report to the training camps and staging areas in Guatemala where the Democratic Front officers remain in command.

This was done to maintain the unity of the exile groups although there are deep differences in political views between Señor Ray and the leaders of the Democratic Front.

Quick Action Opposed

Señor Ray, a soft-spoken engineer who studied in Utah, is opposed to any early military operation from abroad against Dr. Castro.

He thinks that it may open the United States to charges of collusion. He takes the view that it would be better to strike through an internal uprising aided from abroad.

Some of Señor Ray's military associates even question whether a force of 5,000 or 6,000 men, no matter how well trained and equipped, could actually succeed in establishing a substantial beachhead on Cuban territory against the powerful militia regiments armed with Soviet-bloc weapons.

Although some other members of the council have different views Señor Ray has agreed to serve on it in the interest of unity. Dr. Miró Cardona, acting as Cuba's provisional President-in-Exile, formally announced the formation of the Council Tuesday night.

In addition to Dr. Miró Cardona and Señor Ray, the Council includes Dr. Manuel Antonio Varona, who heads the Democratic Revolutionary Front; Manuel Artime, the Front's military commander; Dr. Carlos Hevia, a former President of Cuba; Dr. Justo Carrillo and Dr. Antonio Maceo.

Dr. Miró Cardona, who toured the Guatemalan camps late last week, went to Washington yesterday. This week-end, Dr. Miró Cardona and Dr. Varona plan to meet in New York for a conference. Captain Artime is in Guatemala, acting as Dr. Miró Cardona's personal representative.

Both the Front and the people's Revolutionary Movement are closing their training facilities in Florida.

Members of other groups are still arriving from New York, where recruitment has been under way for months.

Doctors Join Movement

Numerous Cuban doctors in exile in Florida have recently joined the revolutionary forces. Among them there were two of Cuba's most famous surgeons.

According to reports here, a hospital vessel — a converted yacht — has been equipped and is moored somewhere in the Florida keys. Surgical supply concerns here have reported that Cuban doctors have been making heavy purchases of blood plasma and other medical items.

The Cubans here — some of them with military training acquired in fighting with Dr. Castro — are being organized through a system of calls based on applications submitted by the volunteers.

A special intelligence unit of the Democratic Front investigates the volunteers to eliminate suspected Castro agents or per-

sons connected with the former Batista regime.

This is a twin problem facing the council inasmuch as both groups are seeking to infiltrate its army.

Because of charges by Señor Ray's movement that Batista supporters had infiltrated, a new effort is now under way to oust them, especially from positions of influence. United States officials are equally eager to see this completed rapidly and successfully.

The Castro agents — and hundreds of them are believed to be operating rather freely here — pose a more difficult problem. Although the Florida police and Federal authorities are aware of the presence of at least 100 of them little has been accomplished in efforts to deport them.

Occasionally, some are briefly detained on such charges as vagrancy and sometimes are brought into court on what a local police official describes as "selective law enforcement."

Officials here who read today of the charges made yesterday by Cuba's Foreign Minister, Raul Roa, in New York that an attack was being prepared here against the Castro regime are convinced that most of his information came from these intelligence agents.

But they said, many of the detailed charges were completely inaccurate.

They said there appears to be no evidence to support Dr. Roa's accusation that the anti-Castro army is made up of "mercenaries and adventurers." It was declared that the vast majority of the Council's soldiers are Cubans and not what the Cuban Foreign Minister described as "Americans, Puerto Ricans, Spaniards, Nicaraguans, Guatemalans and former Nazis."

Flights to Guatemala

After the front's intelligence unit is satisfied that the volunteers are "clean," they are being advised to report to an assembly point in the Miami area where they are taken by trucks to one or more deactivated air bases. There they are issued khaki uniforms and board unmarked aircraft for flights to Guatemala.

In the strange atmosphere of Miami, bulging with refugees and revolutionaries, the preparations against Dr. Castro are an open secret. They are discussed in the streets, Cuban cafes and restaurants and almost everywhere that two or more Cubans congregate. Local newspapers openly refer to incidents in camps.

The families of the men in camp are reported to receive monthly checks from the Front. In the past, many of the Cubans were training at night or during weekends while holding regular jobs here.

Even the commando specialists who engage in deliveries of weapons and sabotage material to the Cuban underground try to hold jobs.

Families receive letters from their husbands, sons and brothers who are in the army camps but the letters are often censored. It is impossible to determine from what precise spot they have been mailed.

The traffic of couriers between Florida and the island serving the underground goes on constantly, sometimes using the remaining passenger flights between Havana and Miami. More often the couriers travel on boats that run a virtual shuttle between the Florida coast and Cuba carrying instructions, weapons and explosives.

Some of the fast, patrol-type boats are built to specifications in the Miami area. Many of them are tied in the Miami River and navigate freely to and from the Caribbean on their missions.

Special boats equipped with powerful radio transmitters make daily runs to the Cuban coast and relay anti-Castro broadcasts originating here.

A few weeks ago a patrol boat of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service captured a vessel carrying explosives for Señor Ray's underground. Subsequently the boat was released and the inspectors were told to be less observant next time.

Invasion Reported Near

The Columbia Broadcasting System issued a report last night saying that there were "unmistakable signs" that plans for an invasion of Cuba were in their final stages.

According to Stuart Novins, C.B.S. news correspondent now in Miami, mobilization orders have been issued by the anti-Castro command directing members of the invasion units to go to their previously assigned bases.

Bases in Florida were reported to have been cleared of Cuban exile troops. Mr. Novins said they had left by boat from secret ports and in planes from former United States air bases. Ships and planes loaded with uniforms and weapons were reported to be carrying special commando troops to final staging areas in the Caribbean and Central American areas.

The invasion force's first waves, according to the C.B.S. report, will probably have a strength of 4,000 to 5,000 men. They reportedly will be supported by some naval-based weapons and by air cover.

Several contingents of commando troops were said to be already at target areas inside Cuba, heavily armed with sabotage material. Some PT boats were reported to have been moving in and out of the Florida area for the past several days on transport missions to Central America.

The C.B.S. report was given on the "World Tonight" program at 8 P.M. and was repeated on the radio network of the system several times later. It was also carried locally on television by W.C.B.S.-TV.

CASE STUDY: THE PHOENIX PROGRAM

Covert action under Kennedy and later under his successor Lyndon Johnson did not end with actions against Cuba. The United States became involved in Southeast Asia in a quasi-covert way, sending "advisors" to aid allies already fighting in this region. American military strategy in this region would eventually become more conventional, but covert action still played a role in the Vietnam conflict. Laos, for example, became known as the "CIA's War": the agency recruited Hmong soldiers for the army of the American ally Van Pao, training, equipping, and financing these soldiers. The CIA used Air America to transport these soldiers to the fight against Laotian Communist forces known as the Pathet Lao. Air America was one of many companies secretly owned or controlled by the CIA. The CIA tried to create the appearance that these actions being undertaken in Laos were not part of official American policy. The Laotian war lasted over ten years and remained secret from the American public throughout these years.

Within Vietnam, the CIA had played a role for many years. Its precursor, the OSS, sent officers there during World War II to aid the Vietminh in their fight against the Japanese. Later, in April 1954, using another airline subsidiary, the Civil Air Transport, CIA pilots delivered tons of supplies each day to the French fortress of Dienbienphu. After the Geneva Agreements of 1954 which temporarily divided Vietnam in two, the CIA became involved in covert operations in the northern section of the country.

The Phoenix program aimed to destroy support for the Vietcong within South Vietnam.

Edward Lansdale, who had led CIA activities in the Philippines earlier in the decade, was the architect of the agency's campaigns in North Vietnam. These operations were both military and psychological, and included encouraging the migration of Vietnamese Catholics from North to South Vietnam during the 300-day period of free movement following the Geneva accords, contaminating the oil supplies of a bus company in Hanoi, publishing anti-Communist pamphlets, and infiltrating small paramilitary units into the North. These activities were aimed at ruining the reputation of North Vietnam and thus hindering Ho Chi Minh's chances in elections planned for 1956. Those elections, however, were cancelled by South Vietnamese president Diem. The United States supported this decision.

As large numbers of the armed forces of the United States began to enter Vietnam in the 1960s, the CIA took a back seat to the Army's Green Berets. However, the CIA did, under the leadership of William Colby, organize the controversial Phoenix program in Vietnam. The Phoenix program aimed to destroy support for the Vietcong within South Vietnam. It tried to separate those Vietnamese loyal to the South Vietnamese government from those who were aiding the guerrillas. In a war without front lines and without any clear distinction between military and noncombatants, this was a difficult job. The interrogatory techniques developed for this task were controversial, even if often successful. Thus even within a major war, the CIA and covert action

were seen as important components of American strategy.

The first reading that follows is an excerpt from testimony given by K. Barton Osborn, who served in Vietnam from 1967–1968, to the House of Representatives' 1971 Committee on Government Operations. The second reading is an excerpt from remarks made by William Colby, director of the Phoenix program, to the Tufts University symposium on covert action. These two readings present quite different views of the program.

The Vietnam War remains one of the most controversial issues in recent American history. You might want to invite several veterans of this war to speak to the class. What did they think? Did they enlist or were they drafted? Did they see combat? What kind of relationship did they have with the Vietnamese people? You might also ask the veterans what they thought American policy should have been in Vietnam. More guns? Less guns? More covert action? More negotiations? Withdraw faster? Withdraw slower? Never go?

Local veterans' organizations, as well as other local political groups, may be able to provide speakers with detailed knowledge of the Phoenix program.

THE PHOENIX PROGRAM

K. Barton Osborn

(Statement to The 1971 House of Representatives Committee on Government Operations)

Mr. Osborn: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

My name is K. Barton Osborn. I am a resident of Washington, D.C.

I would like to describe my role as it was peripheral to the Phoenix program and give you an idea of the context in which I was associated with both military intelligence and the Central Intelligence Agency program.

I was in Vietnam from September 1967 until December 1968. At that time I was in the Army on active duty. I had been trained for 6 months at Fort Holabird, Md., in a covert classified program of illegal agent handling, which taught us to find, recruit, train, and manage and later terminate agents for military intelligence.

Mr. Reid: Could you explain what you mean by "terminate"?

Mr. Osborn: Terminate, that is to release agents from their duties as they performed them for the agent handler once they no longer were of use for the agent.

Mr. Reid: Do you imply by that with extreme prejudice?

Mr. Osborn: There are two ways: one is with prejudice and one is without prejudice.

With prejudice means simply — without prejudice first of all, is to tell the man or woman he has done a good job; give them a payoff or whatever and let them go; also to establish a future contact arrangement.

With prejudice is subcategorized into two areas. With prejudice may mean simply that the agent did a bad job; in some way was judged not loyal or whatever, and was not to be hired again and was to be put on a list of undesirable personalities which they call "black list."

With extreme prejudice is to murder the individual right out because he or she constitutes a knowledgeable person who may be compromising to present or future operations. That is a termination process. There is a whole cycle called "The intelligence cycle," from the point of needing an agent and going to find one through recruiting the person, training them, managing them, sending them out, receiving them back, having them perform missions and then debrieting them and then eventual termination.

Mr. Reid: Were you aware of or did you participate in anything that reflected extreme prejudice?

Mr. Osborn: Yes, I was. . . .

The Phoenix description was that it was designed to neutralize the core of the VC, interdiction politically, logistically and so forth. I found myself in possession of this information and in need of funds for my agents, because Military Intelligence, although I had been assigned by them to recruit agents, found themselves short on what Mr. Uhl described as the intelligence contingency funding and in fact, had no money to pay the agents once they had been recruited.

I had recruited these people on promises of money to come, but when it came time to pay I didn't have money so I took what incentive gifts — cigarettes and liquor, that were available and had them sold by interpreters on the black market in order to get money for my agents' payment.

The Phoenix coordinator offered me not only the opportunity to utilize the political information I was getting, but also additional money which I may have needed for my agents. From that point on I had no real financial struggle and found myself not only able to pay my agents, but to utilize CIA facilities, such as Air America for transportation housing, covert housing in the city areas where I needed it, such things as safe houses which are areas to meet your agent covertly and debrief; money to rent hotel rooms in order to meet them covertly; agent payments, both overt money payments and incentive gifts such as an occasional motorcycle to a principal agent and so forth.

From the time of my association with the Phoenix program I no longer had any logistical problems. This is how the information was dealt with. I gave it to them in reciprocity for the money and information I received. . . .

I at one point was reporting regularly to people in that area of Da Nang Air Base who may have constituted a threat to the air base's security. I remember at one time I reported an individual who lived in a local village who was reported to me by the local cell as being a logistical officer for the local farmers organization, which is the Vietcong structure at the village level, and the counterintelligence team from that unit went out and picked the individual up and detained him as a suspected VC.

I went back the next day to check out the utilization of my report and whether or not it had been accurately followed through on and so forth. They told me they had the individual detained there and I asked how they were going to deal with him, and they said they were preparing to interrogate him, would I like to attend the interrogation, and I said I would, because I had never seen one. They said it would be an airborne interrogation and I didn't quite conceive that. I went ahead with the marine officer who was a first lieutenant, head of the CIA team.

We took two Marine enlisted men and two Vietnamese males in their 30's or so and we went out to the air wing and we got on a helicopter and flew northwest of Da Nang over some uninhabited area there of flat terrain.

Mr. Reid: What unit was that?

Mr. Osborn: Counterintelligence team of the 1st Marine Division.

Mr. Reid: Of the 1st Marine Division?

Mr. Osborn: That is right. They had a facility there on the 3d Marine Amphibious Force's air wing at Da Nang Air Base.

But we flew over some flat terrain, perhaps 20 miles out of Da Nang, and the two Vietnamese were bound with their hands behind their backs and the two Marine enlisted men kept them off in a sling seat inside the helicopter. The interrogation began not on the individual whom I had reported, but on the extra person, and I didn't know who he was at first and found out that he was a previous detainee who had already been interrogated who had been beaten and who had internal injuries and who was not able to respond to questions. They had brought him along for the purposes of interrogation.

I found out the purpose was this: They antagonized the individual and told him they needed certain information regarding VC activities and he couldn't give it. He hadn't given the information they wanted from him and they demanded it of him and he couldn't respond or wouldn't respond. They antagonized him several times by taking him with his elbows behind his back, hands tied, running him up to the door of the helicopter

and saying: If you don't tell us what we need to know we are going to throw you out of the helicopter. They did this two or three times and he refused to say anything. He couldn't respond. He wouldn't respond. Therefore, on the fourth trip to the door they did throw him out from the helicopter to the ground. That had the effect directly of antagonizing the person I had reported, suspected Vietcong logistics officer, into telling them whatever information they wanted to know regardless of its content, value or truth; he would tell them what they wanted to know simply because his primary objective at that point would be not to follow the first Vietnamese out the door, but rather to return safely to the ground.

Mr. Reid: That was a purposeful, deliberate pushing out the door?

Mr. Osborn: There was no question at all. This was the reason they took this first individual up and the reason that they antagonized him and went through the form of threatening him and throwing him out three times.

Mr. Reid: Who gave the order that he should be pushed out?

Mr. Osborn: The 1st Marine Division lieutenant.

Mr. Reid: There was a lieutenant on board?

Mr. Osborn: That is right. He was the counterintelligence team chief.

Mr. Reid: Do you recall his name?

Mr. Moorhead: Because of the rules, we had better not mention names of individuals in such cases in public session.

Mr. Osborn: In all due respect, I do recall his name, but I am not willing to go into that. You can see that that is irrelevant. In fact, the form of the thing is what we are talking about.

So that we returned to the ground and they proceeded with the interrogation of their own. This happened, not once as an aberration, but twice that I attended. The same airborne procedure, the same dummy on the first hand who was antagonized and then thrown from the helicopter; the second person who was then interrogated and gave whatever information they demanded from him.

They certainly did not know how to elicit information from this person without brutality, for there was no real interrogation session short of the brutalization.

I saw other interrogations, to describe them briefly: The use of the insertion of the 6-inch dowel into the canal of one of my detainee's ears and the tapping through the brain until he died. The starving to death of a Vietnamese woman who was suspected of being a part of the local political education cadre in one of the local villages. They simply starved her to death in a cage there they kept in one of the hooches at that very counterintelligence team headquarters.

There were other methods of operation which they used for interrogation, such as the use of electronic gear such as sealed telephones attached to the genitals of both the men and women's vagina and the men's testicles, and wind the mechanism and create an electrical charge and shock them into submission. I had a lot of conversations about the use of that kind of equipment, although I never saw it used.

Mr. Moorhead: Were these methods that you described conducted by American personnel or —

Mr. Osborn: Americans only. These were unilateral operations not in coordination or with the knowledge of the South Vietnamese Government.

Mr. Reid: And officers were present as well as enlisted men?

Mr. Osborn: Each time. These were my experiences with reporting names of Vietnamese from my agents to American agencies and the resulting interrogations.

UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS IN VIETNAM

(Statement to the 1971 House of Representatives Committee on Government Operations)

Ambassador Colby: The Phoenix program of the Government of South Vietnam is designed to protect the Vietnamese people from terrorism and political, paramilitary, economic and subversive pressure from the Communist clandestine organization in South Vietnam. The Vietcong infrastructure, or VCI, is the leadership apparatus of the Communist attempt to conquer the Vietnamese people and government. The VCI supports the military operations of the Vietcong and North Vietnamese Army units by providing intelligence, recruits or conscripts and logistics support. It also directs and implements a systematic campaign of terrorism against government officials, locally elected leaders and the general population. The result of this terrorism is as follows:

VC TERRORISM	Incidents	Killed	Wounded	Abducted
1969	10,526	6,097	15,074	6,097
1970	11,680	5,951	12,588	6,872
1971 (May)	4,526	2,470	4,701	3,257

The Phoenix program is an integral part of the Vietnamese Government's war effort to bring security to its people since the VCI is a key element of the Communist war effort.

The Phoenix program includes an intelligence program to identify the members of the VCI, an operational program to apprehend them, a legal program to restrain them and a detention program to confine them.

The Phoenix program is an essential element of Vietnam's defense against VCI subversion and terrorism. While some unjustifiable abuses have occurred over the years, as they have in many countries, the Vietnamese and U.S. Governments have worked to stop them, and to produce instead professional and intelligent operations which will meet the VCI attack with stern justice, with equal stress on both words. Considerable evidence has appeared from enemy documents and from former and even current members of the enemy side that, despite some weaknesses, the program has reduced the power of the VCI and its hopes for conquest over the people of South Vietnam. Phoenix is an essential part of the GVN's defense as the VCI is to the Communist attack. U.S. support is fully warranted.

Mr. Moorhead: Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador, for your statement. I am sure your suggestion will be studied closely by the subcommittee because CORDS is a new type of foreign operation.

Mr. Ambassador, did you see the article today in the Washington Post which is headed "Vietnam, a Fragile Security," and then in a smaller heading, "Population Still Up for Grabs"?

It seems to me that we face a situation which I have experienced before in Vietnam, where the official report is always positive. Intelligence people like you are always more optimistic, whether it is on the military side or the civilian side, than

the information we get from independent observers like newspaper reporters.

On page 12 of your testimony, you talk about the traffic on the roads, the bustling marketplaces. This article gives a much less optimistic picture.

I looked also at your supplementary statement about the number of persons killed through VC terrorism. If my arithmetic is correct, if they keep on in 1971 at the rate that they have for the first 5 months, we have approximately the same number killed in 1971 as were killed in 1970. That is a statistic which indicates to me that progress toward pacification is at a slower rate than your general testimony would indicate.

Would you care to comment on this?

Ambassador Colby: I was very interested in the headline there, Mr. Chairman, referring to a fragile situation. About a year ago, a journalist who had been there a while threw up to me the question whether the security situation there was still fragile. We had made quite a point over the previous year or so that the situation was quite fragile. I had to think back and say that I didn't think it was fragile anymore in that sense.

What you have there, I believe, quite frankly, is a situation we have had in our own staff to a considerable degree. The fellow who has been there a little while looks back on the situation a couple of years ago and has a great sense of how different the situation is from what it was a couple of years ago in terms of the security situation and the ability of the people to circulate, the markets work and so forth.

So he is inclined to tell his successor that the situation is good compared to what it was when he came. The new man looks around and realizes you can still get killed by a mine on the road, by a grenade in that very marketplace. Not many of those occur, but some do. He begins to think it is pretty bad.

I think the thrust of that article, Mr. Chairman, was that the security situation is really quite a bit better than it was, and is quite substantially in hand, but that the political problem is yet to be faced. I think that is what the writer of that article was essentially saying, that the political problem of the relationship of the people to the Government has not really been solved to that degree.

I would be inclined to agree that certainly the political identification of the people with the Government has not proceeded as fast as the security situation has, but this is a sequential development. This is the design of the plan. First you produce a reasonable climate of security in which the people dare to participate and maintain security, and then you develop the programs which invite the people's participation in a political sense and involve them in that sense. I think this has been done at the village level to a considerable degree, although it has not in every village, I hasten to say.

The process is building a new political base of this Government from the bottom up. This is just beginning at the local level and it is being gradually moved up the scale from the village to the province to the national level.

I think the sequence of elections at the village hamlet level in 1969 and 1970, and then in the Province councils in 1970, and later in 1970 for the Senate and this year for the National Lower House and the Presidency, shows this sequential development from the bottom up.

This is political development which is quite a different kind of political base than the former governments used to have where power went down to the people. I am well aware that spokesmen such as myself, and probably including myself, have stated a more positive view

of the situation than some of our independent observers have. I do believe, though, that a full evaluation of the situation in Vietnam today shows that the momentum of the strengthening of the Government in security terms, in political terms, and in development terms, is continuing, and will continue in the near future.

Mr. Moorhead: Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. I still point out that the rate of VC killings seems to be at practically the same rate as last year.

Mr. Ambassador, a question with respect to the Phoenix program. That is the same thing as the Phung Hoang program?

Ambassador Colby: It is, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Moorhead: You mentioned that there have been some abuses. Have any of your subordinates reported to you instances of torture being used under the Phoenix program?

Ambassador Colby: We have had reports of a few through our channels. We have also had allegations to the National Assembly and in the Vietnamese press of this kind of thing. We have looked into these. On occasion we have found abuses, as I say, unjustifiable abuses, and in collaboration with the Vietnamese authorities we have moved to stop that sort of nonsense.

Mr. Moorhead: It bothers me, Mr. Ambassador, that the pacification program by its very nature, includes the killing, torture, imprisonment, moving of people, destruction of villages, and the conscious creating of refugees. They may create new hatreds among the people in opposition to the Saigon government.

Have any studies been made on this point? There are certain aspects of the pacification program which make me wonder if we are making friends or enemies. If we are making enemies by this program, our assistance is not only wasteful from a dollar point of view, but in direct contravention of our goals and objectives in Vietnam.

Ambassador Colby: I think, Mr. Chairman, that your characterization of the nature of the program is not quite the same as I would give it. I think the program is one of an expanding defense of the people against the rockets and raids such as were described in the New York Times this morning and some of this sort of thing. I think the purpose is to provide protection to the people and to give the people a voice in their own future and their own Government.

Thus, I believe that there have been a few cases of abuses, as I have mentioned, most people have been killed as the enemy attacked some of these places, either by the local forces or the self-defense forces, and in the course of active operations against the enemy units out in the jungle.

There have been very few movements of people from areas where they could not be defended.

This is in accordance with the Government's overall policy that security will be brought to the people and not the people brought to security, whenever it is possible. I think the trend of the program over the past several years, in terms of the millions of people it has protected, more than overcomes the occasional unjustified abuse.

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PLAUSIBLE DENIABILITY

When Congressional investigations of the CIA in 1975 revealed that the agency had undertaken assassination plots against foreign leaders, many Americans were aghast. Such activities had not been part of their image of the role of the CIA. The investigators specifically questioned CIA officials about Operation Mongoose in order to find out who had ordered these acts. In their testimonies, Richard Bissell and Richard Helms, major figures in the CIA, both indicated that there were no written directives to kill foreign leaders, but that there was an understanding that such attempts fit into policy guidelines.

There were no written directives to kill foreign leaders, but that there was an understanding that such attempts fit into policy guidelines.

Both men pointed out that the CIA wanted to maintain "plausible deniability" for the chief executive, hiding proof of the President's knowledge of covert actions so that he could later deny knowledge of these operations. The Congressional committees looking into the CIA in the 1970s questioned the appropriateness of that concept.

The following reading is an excerpt from these 1975 Congressional hearings. Discuss with students the concept of "plausible deniability," and contrast this with the President's obligation to be informed about the workings of his/her administration. You might also want to discuss more fully the goal of Operation Mongoose — the assassination of a foreign leader. Should such operations be a part of American foreign policy, or should they be forbidden? What if such a plan could have been used against Adolf Hitler? What about such leaders as Manuel Noriega?

PLAUSIBLE DENIABILITY

Report by the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Frank Church, Chair (excerpt) (Washington, D.C. Government Printing Office 1975)

Helms recalled that during the MONGOOSE period, "it was made abundantly clear . . . to everybody involved in the operation that the desire was to get rid of the Castro regime and to get rid of Castro . . . the point was that no limitations were put on this injunction."

Senator Mathias: Let me draw an example from history. When Thomas Beckett was proving to be an annoyance, as Castro, the King said who will rid me of this man. He didn't say to somebody, go out and murder him. He said who will rid me of this man, and let it go at that.

Mr. Helms: That is a warming reference to the problem.

Senator Mathias: You feel that spans the generations and the centuries?

Mr. Helms: I think it does, sir.

Senator Mathias: And that is typical of the kind of thing which might be said, which might be taken by the Director or by anybody else as Presidential authorization to go forward?

Mr. Helms: That is right. But in answer to that, I realize that one sort of grows up in [the] tradition of the time and I think that any of us would have found it very difficult to discuss assassinations with a President of the U.S. I just think we all had the feeling that we're hired out to keep those things out of the Oval Office.

Senator Mathias: Yet at the same time you felt that some spark had been transmitted, that that was within the permissible limits?

Mr. Helms: Yes, and if he had disappeared from the scene they would not have been unhappy.

Helms said that he was never told by his superiors to kill Castro, but that:

> *No member of the Kennedy Administration . . . ever told me that [assassination] was proscribed, [or] ever referred to it in that fashion . . . Nobody ever said that [assassination] was ruled out.*

Helms said that the delivery of poison pills for assassinating Castro:

> *with all the other things that were going on at that time . . . seemed to be within the permissible part of this effort . . . In the perceptions of the time and the things we were trying to do this was one human life against many other human lives that were being lost.*

Bissell repeatedly coupled Eisenhower and Kennedy when he speculated that the Presidents would have been advised in a manner calculated to maintain "plausible deniability."

> *In the case of an operation of high sensitivity of the sort that we are discussing, there was a further objective that would have been pursued at various levels, and that was specifically with respect to the President, to protect the President. And, therefore, the way in which I believe that Allen Dulles would have attempted to do that was to have indicated to the two successive Presidents the general objective of the operation that was contemplated, to make that sufficiently clear so that the President — either President Eisenhower or President Kennedy — could have ordered the termination of the operation, but to give the President just as little*

information about it as possible beyond an understanding of its general purpose. Such an approach to the President would have had as its purpose to leave him in the position to deny knowledge of the operation if it should surface.

My belief — a belief based, as I have said, only on my knowledge of Allen Dulles as an individual, and of his mode of operations — is that authorization was obtained by him in the manner that I have indicated. I used the word on Monday "circumlocutious," and it was to this approach that I referred.

Assuming for the moment that I am correct, since the effort would have been to minimize the possibility of embarrassment to the President, it is, I think, understandable that neither I nor anyone else in the Agency would have discussed this operation on our own initiative with, for instance, members of the White House staff.

The effort would have been to hold to the absolute minimum the number of people who knew that the President had been consulted, had been notified and had given, perhaps only tacitly, his authorization.

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7

Checks and Balances

CONGRESS ASSERTS ITSELF

Inheriting a country badly divided by the Vietnam War, Richard Nixon sought to affect Vietnam policy in a dramatic fashion. As Vice President under President Eisenhower from 1953 until 1961, Nixon had seen covert actions which had been praised as successful. As President, Nixon also sought to include covert action in his foreign policy strategies. Nixon's policy of "Vietnamization" combined the withdrawal of American ground troops with the massive bombing of the enemy, including the secret bombing of Cambodia. This bombing, christened "Operation Menu," was disguised by altering military records. Nixon also continued the CIA's "private war" in Laos, which relied on massive bombing as well.

Nixon saw Allende as a dangerous Marxist who would harm American business interests.

President Nixon also used covert action to "protect American interests" in other parts of the world. Salvador Allende, the democratically elected President of Chile, became one of Nixon's prime targets. Allende had run for the presidency of Chile in 1964, but had been defeated by Eduardo Frei who had received covert support from the CIA. Frei, however, was not eligible to succeed himself in 1970, and Allende once again became a leading candidate. Nixon saw Allende as a dangerous Marxist, someone who would change the economic order of his country, harm American business interests, and export revolutions throughout South America. Nixon asked the CIA to do what it could to ensure Allende's defeat. The CIA was not alone in this work. An American corporation, International Telephone and Telegraph, whose Board of Directors included John McCone, former director of Central Intelligence, was also opposed to Allende. With the help of the CIA, ITT passed large sums of money to Allende's enemies. Much to their disappointment, however, Allende eventually won the election in 1970.

Despite Allende's success in a democratic election, the United States con-

tinued to oppose him. President Nixon ordered the CIA to "make the economy scream" in Chile. The CIA, under the leadership of Richard Helms, deliberately did what it could to create economic hardship and therefore unpopularity for Allende in Chile. The CIA began a secret series of initiatives known as Track II, which led to plans to overthrow Allende by a coup d'etat. Track II was undertaken without the knowledge of the American Ambassador to Chile, Edward Korry, who had personally urged the President to avoid such actions. The CIA began to meet with groups of Chilean generals who opposed Allende.

One of these groups assassinated General Rene Schneider, a military leader who had acted to preserve democratic process in Chile. The CIA was not directly implicated in this event; its surrogate group, however, proved to be hard to control.

American efforts to hamper the Allende government were further increased when intelligence reports noted the presence of Cuban officials in Chile. In 1973 President Allende's government was hindered by massive strikes which jeopardized his ability to govern — some of the striking unions were supported by American money. Later that year, Allende was indeed overthrown and killed in a coup d'etat. Although a Congressional investigation in 1975 concluded that there was no *direct* American involvement in the successful coup against Allende, the United States had certainly helped to lay the groundwork for that deed.

Nixon involved the agency in undercover operations against American citizens within the United States. These activities, blatant violations of the legal mandate of the CIA, became known as "Operation Chaos."

Nixon's belief in covert action also led the CIA into new territory — domestic covert operations. Fearing opposition to the Vietnam War as well as demands by blacks for power, Nixon involved the agency in undercover operations against American citizens within the United States. These activities, blatant violations of the legal mandate of the CIA, were organized by Tom Charles Huston, a staff assistant to President Nixon. The Nixon administration's plan for domestic actions became known as "Operation Chaos." These actions assumed that dissenters were similar to, or even controlled by, enemies abroad. For Nixon, then, Operation Chaos was a logical extension of CIA activity. This expansion of domestic intelligence work was also apparent in "Watergate" —the break-in at Democratic party headquarters in 1972. Former CIA officers and contract agents such as E. Howard Hunt, as well as former members of Brigade 2506, were among those arrested and found to be working for the Committee to Re-Elect the President (CREEP). The unwanted publicity which the CIA received during investigations of Operation Chaos and the Watergate affair greatly tarnished the agency's reputation.

President Ford inherited the CIA at this time, and William Colby, formerly the head of the Phoenix Program, became the director of Central Intelligence. At this same time, both houses of Congress set up committees to investigate the work of the CIA. The Church Committee, technically the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities,

revealed to the American people many things that had happened under the cloak of secrecy that were diametrically opposed to public pronouncements. The House of Representatives' committee, under the chairmanship of Otis Pike, had similar news to report. The CIA, under orders from the President, had undertaken assassination attempts, the subversion of legally constituted governments, and improper domestic activities. Director Colby's testimony on these points angered many CIA officers who felt that no secrets (the "family jewels," in CIA's parlance) should be revealed.

But Congress was angered in a different way, and responded to these reports with the Hughes-Ryan Amendment (Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974). Hughes-Ryan was an attempt to change the rules of CIA operations. Although the President retained the power to use the CIA, certain committees of Congress would have a more substantial and formalized role in that process. For each new covert operation, the President would have to submit a finding "in a timely fashion" to the Congressional committees, justifying the importance of each operation.

This amendment was put to use as the United States undertook covert actions in Angola in 1975. With Angola emerging from 500 years of Portuguese rule, three groups vied to lead the country's independence movement. The Marxist faction MPLA, led by Agostinho Neto, was opposed by the United States, who covertly provided funds to two other groups, Holden Roberto's FNLA and Jonas Savimbi's UNITA. As fighting between these groups continued, so did covert assistance from the United States. Cubans came to fight for the MPLA, and soon the FNLA and UNITA had new allies as well — white troops from South Africa. As a result, the United States soon found itself allied with South African troops in southern Africa. The United States Congress did not like the ramifications of that alliance, and so cut off funding in a new display of Congressional control over covert action.

The first reading in this section is taken from the Church Committee report. In this part of the report, the Committee looks closely at a September 15, 1970 White House meeting between President Richard Nixon and Richard Helms, director of Central Intelligence. In this meeting, Nixon instructed Helms to take action against the Allende government. Helms' handwritten notes of the meeting were a vital piece of evidence, and are quoted here by the Committee.

Ask students how they would interpret Director Helms' notes. If the CIA intervened in Chilean politics based on this memo, would they hold Helms or Nixon responsible? Both?

If President Allende nationalized American businesses there, that would have had an adverse effect on those companies. Does it follow that an American government has the right to protect those companies? How far should it go to protect them? Is the good of the United States the same as the good of American companies? What about the role of the Chilean government? How much control does it have a right to have over business in its country?

The second reading in this section is also an excerpt from the Church

Committee report. One of the major topics of the Committee was the question of whether the United States government had been involved in assassination plots against foreign leaders. The Committee studied five alleged plots and published a volume on this issue. The Committee recognized that Fidel Castro of Cuba, Patrice Lumumba of the Congo, Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic, Rene Schneider of Chile, and Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam had all been unpopular with various American regimes, but not all had been targeted for assassination by the CIA.

How did the Committee answer the questions which it presented about U.S. involvement in assassination plots?

What conclusions can you draw from these answers?

Do you think that the United States should have a policy on the propriety of assassinating political opponents? Explain.

While the Congressional investigations of the Central Intelligence Agency were taking place, President Ford set up the Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States on January 4, 1975. The third reading in this section comes from this report. This commission was chaired by Vice President Nelson A. Rockefeller, and included Lane Kirkland (Secretary-Treasurer of the AFL-CIO) and Ronald Reagan, among others. This June 1975 report points out the origins of the CIA's involvement in domestic espionage, and details the use of the CIA by President Nixon for political purposes. The commission discovered that the CIA maintained files on Students for a Democratic Society, Women's Strike for Peace, Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee, Black Panther Party, Nation of Islam, the American Indian Movement, the Women's Liberation Movement, and Clergy and Laymen Concerned About Vietnam, among other groups. The Commission called for an end to CIA involvement in domestic affairs and criticized former President Nixon's use of the agency.

This might be an appropriate time to discuss with students the great polarization that characterized American politics in the late 1960s. You may want to complement this reading with historical information about that time, and you may want to have students do some kind of historical research into the events and opinions that marked the Nixon years.

Discuss with students the use of the CIA for domestic work. Do they think this work is justifiable? An infringement on individual liberty?

The final reading in this section is the "Hughes-Ryan Amendment." This short amendment to Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 was much more important than its size would indicate. Through this amendment, Congress was attempting to put an end to "plausible deniability" by directly connecting the President and the Congress to the operations of the CIA.

THE PRESIDENT'S INITIAL INSTRUCTIONS AND BACKGROUND

Report by the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Frank Church, chair (excerpt) (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975)

(a) September 15 White House meeting

On September 15, 1970, President Nixon met with his Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, CIA Director Richard Helms, and Attorney General John Mitchell at the White House. The topic was Chile. Handwritten notes taken by Director Helms at that meeting reflect both its tenor and the President's instructions:

> *One in 10 chance perhaps, but save Chile!*
> *worth spending*
> *not concerned risks involved*
> *no involvement of Embassy*
> *$10,000,000 available, more if necessary*
> *full-time job — best men we have*
> *game plan*
> *make the economy scream*
> *48 hours for plan of action*

In his testimony before the Select Committee, Director Helms recalled coming away from the meeting on September 15 with:

> *[the] impression . . . that the President came down very hard, that he wanted something done, and he didn't much care how and that he was prepared to make money available . . . This was a pretty all-inclusive order . . . If I ever carried a marshall's baton in my knapsack out of the Oval Office, it was that day.*

However, none of the CIA officers believed that assassination was within the guidelines Helms had been given.

Senator Hart: . . . did the kind of carte blanche mandate you carried, the marshall's baton that you carried out in a knapsack to stop Allende from assuming office include physical elimination?

Mr. Helms: Well, not in my mind, because when I became Director, I had already made up my mind that we weren't going to have any of that business when I was Director, and I had made that clear to my fellows, and I think they will tell you this.

The following day, September 16, Director Helms called a meeting at the CIA to discuss the Chilean situation. At this meeting, he related to his colleagues his understanding of the President's instructions:

> *2. The Director told the group that President Nixon had decided that an Allende regime in Chile was unacceptable to the United States. The President asked the Agency to prevent Allende from coming to power or to unseat him. The President authorized $10,000,000 for this purpose, if needed. Further, the Agency is to carry out this mission without coordination with the Departments of State or Defense.*

Henry Kissinger's recollection of the September 15 meeting with President Nixon is in accord with that of Richard Helms. Although Dr. Kissinger did not recall the President's instructions to be as precise as those related by Director Helms, he did testify that:

> *the primary thrust of the September 15th meeting was to urge Helms to do whatever he could to prevent Allende from being seated.*
>
> *It is clear that President Nixon wanted him [Helms] to encourage the Chilean military to cooperate or to take the initiative in preventing Allende from taking office.*

ALLEGED ASSASSINATION PLOTS INVOLVING FOREIGN LEADERS

Report by the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Frank Church, chair (excerpt)
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975)

D. Summary of Findings and Conclusions

1. The Questions Presented

The Committee sought to answer four broad questions:

Assassination plots — Did United States officials instigate, attempt, aid and abet, or acquiesce in plots to assassinate foreign leaders?

Involvement in other killings — Did United States officials assist foreign dissidents in a way which significantly contributed to the killing of foreign leaders?

Authorization — When there was involvement by United States officials in assassination plots or other killings, were such activities authorized and if so, at what levels of our Government?

Communication and control — Even if not authorized in fact, were the assassination activities perceived by those involved to be within the scope of their lawful authority? If they were so perceived, was there inadequate control exercised by higher authorities over the agencies to prevent such misinterpretation?

2. Summary of Findings and Conclusions on the Plots

The Committee investigated alleged United States involvement in assassination plots in five foreign countries (see chart).[1]

The evidence concerning each alleged assassination can be summarized as follows:

Patrice Lumumba (Congo/Zaire) — In the Fall of 1960, two CIA officials were asked by superiors to assassinate Lumumba. Poisons were sent to the Congo and some exploratory steps were taken toward gaining access to Lumumba. Subsequently, in early 1961, Lumumba was killed by Congolese rivals. It does not

Country	*Individual involved*[2]
Cuba	Fidel Castro
Congo (Zaire)	Patrice Lumumba
Dominican Republic	Rafael Trujillo
Chile	General Rene Schneider
South Vietnam	Ngo Dinh Diem

[1] In addition to the plots discussed in the body of this report, the Committee received some evidence of CIA involvement in plans to assassinate President Sukarno of Indonesia and "Papa Doc" Duvalier of Haiti. Former Deputy Director for Plans Richard Bissell testified that the assassination of Sukarno had been "contemplated" by the CIA, but that planning had proceeded no farther than identifying an "asset" whom it was believed might be recruited to kill Sukarno. Arms were supplied to dissident groups in Indonesia, but, according to Bissell, those arms were not intended for assassination. (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 89)

Walter Elder, Executive Assistant to CIA Director John McCone, testified that the Director authorized the CIA to furnish arms to dissidents planning the overthrow of Haiti's dictator, Duvalier. Elder told the Committee that while the assassination of Duvalier was not contemplated by the CIA, the arms were furnished "to help [the dissidents] take what measures were deemed necessary to replace the government," and it was realized that Duvalier might be killed in the course of the overthrow. (Elder, 8/13/75, p. 79)

[2] Assassination plots against the Cuban leadership sometimes contemplated action against Raul Castro and Che Guevarra. In South Vietnam, Diem's brother Ngo Dinh Nhu was killed at the same time as Diem.

appear from the evidence that the United States was in any way involved in the killing.

Fidel Castro (Cuba) — United States Government personnel plotted to kill Castro from 1960 to 1965. American underworld figures and Cubans hostile to Castro were used in these plots, and were provided encouragement and material support by the United States.

Rafael Trujillo (Dominican Republic) —Trujillo was shot by Dominican dissidents on May 31, 1961. From early in 1960 and continuing to the time of the assassination, the United States Government generally supported these dissidents. Some Government personnel were aware that the dissidents intended to kill Trujillo. Three pistols and three carbines were furnished by American officials, although a request for machine guns was later refused. There is conflicting evidence concerning whether the weapons were knowingly supplied for use in the assassination and whether any of them were present at the scene.

Ngo Dinh Diem (South Vietnam) — Diem and his brother, Nhu, were killed on November 2, 1963, in the course of a South Vietnamese Generals' coup. Although the United States Government supported the coup, there is no evidence that American officials favored the assassination. Indeed, it appears that the assassination of Diem was not part of the Generals' pre-coup planning but was instead a spontaneous act which occurred during the coup and was carried out without United States involvement or support.

General Rene Schneider (Chile) — On October 25, 1970, General Schneider died of gunshot wounds inflicted three days earlier while resisting a kidnap attempt. Schneider, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and a constitutionalist opposed to military coups, was considered an obstacle in efforts to prevent Salvador Allende from assuming the office of President of Chile. The United States Government supported, and sought to instigate a military coup to block Allende. U.S. officials supplied financial aid, machine guns and other equipment to various military figures who opposed Allende. Although the CIA continued to support coup plotters up to Schneider's shooting, the record indicates that the CIA had withdrawn active support of the group which carried out the actual kidnap attempt on October 22, which resulted in Schneider's death. Further, it does not appear that any of the equipment supplied by the CIA to coup plotters in Chile was used in the kidnapping. There is no evidence of a plan to kill Schneider or that United States officials specifically anticipated that Schneider would be shot during the abduction.

Assassination capability (Executive action) — In addition to these five cases, the Committee has received evidence that ranking Government officials discussed, and may have authorized, the establishment within the CIA of a generalized assassination capability. During these discussions, the concept of assassination was not affirmatively disavowed.

Similarities and differences among the plots —The assassination plots all involved Third World countries, most of which were relatively small and none of which possessed great political or military strength. Apart from that similarity, there were significant differences among the plots.

(1) Whether United States officials initiated the plot, or were responding to requests of local dissidents for aid.

(2) Whether the plot was specifically intended to kill a foreign leader, or whether the leader's death was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of an attempt to overthrow the government.

The Castro and Lumumba cases are

examples of plots conceived by United States officials to kill foreign leaders.

In the Trujillo case, although the United States Government certainly opposed his regime, it did not initiate the plot. Rather, United States officials responded to requests for aid from local dissidents whose aim clearly was to assassinate Trujillo. By aiding them, the country was implicated in the assassination, regardless of whether the weapons actually supplied were meant to kill Trujillo or were only intended as symbols of support for the dissidents.

The Schneider case differs from the Castro and Trujillo cases. The United States Government, with full knowledge that Chilean dissidents considered General Schneider an obstacle to their plans, sought a coup and provided support to the dissidents. However, even though the support included weapons, it appears that the intention of both the dissidents and the United States officials was to abduct General Schneider, not to kill him. Similarly, in the Diem case, some United States officials wanted Diem removed and supported a coup to accomplish his removal, but there is no evidence that any of those officials sought the death of Diem himself.

3. Summary of Findings and Conclusions on the Issues of Authority and Control

To put the inquiry into assassination allegations in context, two points must be made clear. First, there is no doubt that the United States Government opposed the various leaders in question. Officials at the highest levels objected to the Castro and Trujillo regimes, believed the accession of Allende to power in Chile would be harmful to American interests, and thought of Lumumba as a dangerous force in the heart of Africa. Second, the evidence on assassinations has to be viewed in the context of other, more massive activities against the regimes in question. For example, the plots against Fidel Castro personally cannot be understood without considering the fully authorized, comprehensive assaults upon his regime, such as the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961 and Operation MONGOOSE in 1962.

Once methods of coercion and violence are chosen, the probability of loss of life is always present. There is, however, a significant difference between a cold-blooded, targeted, intentional killing of an individual foreign leader and other forms of intervening in the affairs of foreign nations. Therefore, the Committee has endeavored to explore as fully as possible the questions of how and why the plots happened, whether they were authorized, and if so, at what level. The picture that emerges from the evidence is not a clear one. This may be due to the system of deniability and the consequent state of the evidence which, even after our long investigation, remains conflicting and inconclusive. Or it may be that there were in fact serious shortcomings in the system of authorization, so that an activity such as assassination could have been undertaken by an agency of the United States Government without express authority.

The Committee finds that the system of executive command and control was so ambiguous that it is difficult to be certain at what levels assassination activity was known and authorized. This situation creates the disturbing prospect that Government officials might have undertaken the assassination plots without it having been uncontrovertibly clear that there was explicit authorization from the Presidents. It is also possible that there might have been a successful "plausible denial" in which Presidential authoriza-

tion was issued but is now obscured. Whether or not the respective Presidents knew of or authorized the plots, as chief executive officer of the United States, each must bear the ultimate responsibility for the activities of his subordinates.

The Committee makes four other major findings. The first relates to the Committee's inability to make a finding that the assassination plots were authorized by the Presidents or other persons above the governmental agency or agencies involved. The second explains why certain officials may have perceived that, according to their judgment and experience, assassination was an acceptable course of action. The third criticizes agency officials for failing on several occasions to disclose their plans and activities to superior authorities, or for failing to do so with sufficient detail and clarity. The fourth criticizes Administration officials for not ruling out assassination, particularly after certain Administration officials had become aware of prior assassination plans and the establishment of a general assassination capability.

There is admittedly a tension among the findings. This tension reflects a basic conflict in the evidence. While there are some conflicts over facts, it may be more important that there appeared to have been two differing perceptions of the same facts. This distinction may be the result of the differing backgrounds of those persons experienced in covert operations as distinguished from those who were not. Words of urgency which may have meant killing to the former, may have meant nothing of the sort to the latter.

While we are critical of certain individual actions, the Committee is also mindful of the inherent problems in a system which relies on secrecy, compartmentation, circumlocution, and the avoidance of clear responsibility. This system creates the risk of confusion and rashness in the very areas where clarity and sober judgment are most necessary.

REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT BY THE COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES

Nelson A. Rockefeller, chairman (June 1975, excerpt)

E. CHAOS in Full-Scale Operation — Mid-1969

By mid-1969, Operation CHAOS took on the organizational form which would continue for the following three years. Its staff had increased to 36. (Eventually it totaled 52.) In June 1969, a Deputy Chief was assigned to the Operation to assist in administrative matters and to assume some of the responsibilities of handling the tightly-held communications. There was a further delegation of responsibility with the appointment of three branch chiefs in the operation.

The increase in size and activity of the Operation was accompanied by further isolation and protection measures. The group had already been physically located in a vaulted basement area, and tighter security measures were adopted in connection with communications of the Operation. These measures were extreme, even by normally strict CIA standards. An exclusive channel for communication with the FBI was also established which severely restricted dissemination both to and from the Bureau of CHAOS-related matters.

On September 6, 1969, Director Helms distributed an internal memorandum to the head of each of the directorates within CIA, instructing that support was to be given to the activities of Operation CHAOS. Both the distribution of the memorandum and the nature of the directives contained in it were most unusual. These served to underscore the importance of its substance.

Helms confirmed in the September 6 memorandum that the CHAOS group had the principal operational responsibilities for conducting the Agency's activities in the "radical milieu." Helms expected that each division of the Agency would cooperate "both in exploiting existing sources and in developing new ones, and that [the Special Operations Group] will have the necessary access to such sources and operational assets."

Helms further stated in the memorandum that he believed the CIA had "the proper approach in discharging this sensitive responsibility while strictly observing the statutory and *de facto* proscription on Agency domestic involvements."

The September 6 memorandum, prepared after discussions with the Chief of the Operation, among others, served at least three important functions: First, it confirmed, beyond question, the importance which Operation CHAOS had attained in terms of Agency objectives. Second, it replied to dissent which had been voiced within the CIA concerning the Operation. Third, it ensured that CHAOS would receive whatever support it needed, including personnel.

G. Collection, Indexing, and Filing of Information by Operation CHAOS

The volume of information passing through the CHAOS group by mid-1969 was great. As Director Helms pointed out in his September 6, 1969, memorandum to the Directorates, the Operation's main problem was a backlog of undigested raw information which required analysis and indexing.

Not only was the Agency receiving FBI reports on antiwar activities, but with the rise of international conferences against

the war, and student and radical travel abroad, information flowed in from the Agency's overseas stations as well.

The Operation had gathered all the information it could from the Agency's central registry. According to the Chief of the Operation, that information for the most part consisted of raw data gathered on individuals by the FBI which had not been analyzed by the Agency because the information contained nothing of foreign intelligence value.

CHAOS also availed itself of the information gained through the CIA's New York mail intercept. The Operation supplied a watch list of United States citizens to be monitored by the staff of the mail intercept. The number of mail items intercepted and sent to CHAOS during its operation were sufficient in number to have filled two drawers in a filing cabinet. All of these items were letters or similar material between the United States and the Soviet Union.

In addition, Operation CHAOS received materials from an international communications activity of another agency of the government. The Operation furnished a watch list of names to the other agency and received a total of approximately 1100 pages of materials overall. The program to furnish the Operation with these materials was not terminated until CHAOS went out of existence. All such materials were returned to the originating agency by the CIA in November 1974 because a review of the materials had apparently raised a question as to the legality of their being held by CIA. The materials concerned for the most part anti-war activities, travel to international peace conferences and movements of members of various dissident groups. The communications passed between the United States and foreign countries. None was purely domestic.

During one period, Operation CHAOS also appears to have received copies of booking slips for calls made between points in the United States and abroad. The slips did not record the substance of the calls, but rather showed the identities of the caller and the receiver, and the date and time of the call. The slips also indicated whether the call went through.

Most of the officers assigned to the Operation were analysts who read the materials received by it and extracted names and other information for indexing in the computer system used by the Operation and for inclusion in the Operation's many files. It appears that, because of the great volume of materials received by Operation CHAOS and the time pressures on the Operation, little judgment could be, or was, exercised in this process. The absense of such judgment led, in turn, to the inclusion of a substantial amount of data in the records of the Operation having little, if anything, bearing upon its foreign intelligence objective.

The names of all persons mentioned in intelligence source reports received by Operation CHAOS were computer-indexed. The computer printout on a person or organization or subject would contain references to all documents, files or communications traffic where the name appeared. Eventually, approximately 300,000 names of American citizens and organizations were thus stored in the CHAOS computer system.

The computerized information was streamed or categorized on a "need to know" basis, progressing from the least sensitive to the most sensitive. A special computer "password" was required in order to gain access to each stream. (This multi-stream characteristic of the computer index caused it to be dubbed the "Hydra" system.) The computer system was used much like a library card index to locate intelligence reports stored in the CHAOS library of files.

The files, like the computer index, were also divided into different levels of security. A "201," or personality, file would be opened on an individual when enough information had been collected to warrant a file or when the individual was of interest to another government agency that looked to the CIA for information. The regular 201 file generally contained information such as place of birth, family, occupation and organizational affiliation. In addition, a "sensitive" file might also be maintained on that same person. The sensitive file generally encompassed matters which were potentially embarrassing to the Agency or matters obtained from sources by methods which the Agency sought to protect. Operation CHAOS also maintained nearly 1000 "subject" files on numerous organizations.[1]

Random samplings of the Operation's files show that in great part, the files consisted of undigested FBI reports or overt materials such as new clippings on the particular subject.

An extreme example of the extent to which collection could go once a file was opened is contained in the Grove Press, Inc., file. The file apparently was opened because the company had published a book by Kim Philby, the British intelligence officer who turned out to be a Soviet agent. The name Grove Press was thus listed as having intelligence interest, and the CHAOS analysts collected all available information on the company. Grove Press, in its business endeavors, had also produced the sex-oriented motion picture, "I Am Curious Yellow" and so the Operation's analysts dutifully clipped and filmed cinema critics' commentaries upon the film.

From among the 300,000 names in the CHAOS computer index, a total of approximately 7,200 separate personality files were developed on citizens of the United States.

In addition, information of on-going intelligence value was digested in summary memoranda for the internal use of the Operation. Nearly 3,500 such memoranda were developed during the history of CHAOS.

Over 3,000 memoranda on digested information were disseminated, where appropriate, to the FBI. A total of 37 highly sensitive memoranda originated by Operation CHAOS were sent over the signature of the Director of Central Intelligence to the White House, to the Secretary of State, to the Director of the FBI or to the Secret Service.

Conclusions

Some domestic activities of Operation CHAOS unlawfully exceeded the CIA's statutory authority, even though the declared mission of gathering intelligence abroad as to foreign influence on domestic dissident activities was proper.

Most significantly, the Operation became a respository for large quantities of information on the domestic activities of American citizens. This information was derived principally from FBI reports or from overt sources and not from clandestine collection by the CIA. Much of the information was not directly related to the question of the existence of foreign connections with domestic dissidence.

[1] The organizations, to name a few, included: Students for a Democratic Society (SDS); Young Communist Workers Liberation League (YCWLL); National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam; Women's Strike for Peace; Freedomways Magazine and Freedomways Associated, Inc.; American Indian Movement (AIM); Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC); Draft Resistance Groups (U.S.); Cross World Books and Periodicals, Inc.; U.S. Committee to Aid the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam; Grove Press, Inc.; Nation of Islam; Youth International Party (YIP); Women's Liberation Movement; Black Panther Party (BPP); Venceremos Brigade; Clergy and Laymen Concerned About Vietnam.

It was probably necessary for the CIA to accumulate an information base on domestic dissident activities in order to assess fairly whether the activities had foreign connections. The FBI would collect information but would not evaluate it. But the accumulation of domestic data in the Operation exceeded what was reasonably required to make such an assessment and was thus improper.

The use of agents of the Operation on three occasions to gather information within the United States on strictly domestic matters was beyond the CIA's authority. In addition the intelligence disseminations and those portions of a major study prepared by the Agency which dealt with purely domestic matters were improper.

The isolation of Operation CHAOS within the CIA and its independence from supervision by the regular chain of command within the clandestine service made it possible for the activities of the Operation to stray over the bounds of the Agency's authority without the knowledge of senior officials. The absence of any regular review of these activities prevented timely correction of such missteps as did occur.

THE HUGHES-RYAN AMENDMENT

Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 (22 U.S.C. 2422)

Sec. 662. Limitation on Intelligence Activities — No funds appropriated under the authority of this or any other Act may be expended by or on behalf of the Central Intelligence Agency for operations in foreign countries, other than activities intended solely for obtaining necessary intelligence, unless and until the President finds that each such operation is important to the national security of the United States and reports, in a timely fashion, a description and scope of each operation to the appropriate committees of Congress. . . .

RICHARD NIXON RESPONDS

President Nixon was proud of his foreign policy successes. He believed that a politician had to be pragmatic, and he believed secret activities were an essential part of this strategy. National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger (who later served as Secretary of State under Nixon and Gerald Ford) was often involved in secret diplomacy. Such diplomacy was a factor in the Paris Peace Treaty negotiated by Kissinger. In a 1973 speech to an audience of prisoners of war who had just come home from Vietnam as a result of this treaty, the President justified the use of secrecy in international relations.

His words stand in marked contrast to those of Wilson fifty-five years earlier. Secrecy, said Nixon, passed the highest test of all — it worked. Have students compare Nixon's views on secrecy to Wilson's views expressed in his speech on the Fourteen Points. Where do they disagree? What was Wilson's view of the world? Nixon's? Is there any ground for agreement between them? Ask students with whom they agree? Why?

RICHARD NIXON RESPONDS

"Remarks of the President at a Reception for Returned Prisoners of War," May 24, 1973 (excerpt)

One other subject that is somewhat sensitive that I will touch upon only briefly, that I would like to ask for your support on, is with regard to the security of the kind of negotiations that we have.

I want to be quite blunt. Had we not had secrecy, had we not had secret negotiations with the North Vietnamese, had we not had secret negotiations prior to the Soviet Summit, had we not had secret negotiations over a period of time with the Chinese leaders, let me say quite bluntly, there would have been no China initiative, there would have been no limitation of arms for the Soviet Union and no summit, and had we not had that kind of security, and that kind of secrecy that allowed for the kind of exchange that is essential, you men would still be in Hanoi rather than Washington today.

And let me say, I think it is time in this country to quit making national heroes out of those who steal secrets and publish them in the newspapers.

Because, gentlemen, you see, in order to continue these great initiatives for peace, we must have confidentiality, we must have secret communications. It isn't that we are trying to keep anything from the American people that the American people should know. It isn't that we are trying to keep something from the press that the press should print. But it is that what we are trying to do is to accomplish our goal, make a deal. And when we are dealing with potential adversaries, those negotiations must have the highest degree of confidentiality. . . .

I now want to talk about why the United States, after all that it has done for the world in World War II, after the billions that it has poured out since World War II, its sacrifices in Korea, its sacrifices in Vietnam, why we, the American people, have to continue to carry this load.

As I said earlier, believe me, as President, what a relief it would be to say, "Now that we have peace in Vietnam, we have a new relationship with China and Russia, we can simply turn away from the problems of the world and turn to the problems at home."

I can assure you gentlemen that if we were to follow that course, we would find very soon that we would be living in a terribly dangerous world. The world is safer today than it was four and one-half years ago. It can be more safe in the years ahead. But that will only happen provided we follow the course that I have tried to lay out to you here today.

As I look to that future, therefore, it is vitally important that the United States continue to play the world role.

Let's look at just this century. We don't need to go back any further than that. I can imagine some of you in those long hours of captivity were thinking back over several centuries. In any event, looking back just over this century, World War I, the United States could stand aside. After all, there was Britain, there was France, two great powers who thought as we did about the world, and they could carry the load. And then we came in toward the end in World War II. The United States, for a time, could stand aside because Great Britain was still strong and France at the beginning had some strength, but eventually we had to come in.

But today, look at the world. Among the free nations of the world there is no one

else, not the Japanese, as you well know, even though they have the economic strength, they do not have the military strength, and cannot be allowed to acquire it under their constitution; and not one nation in Europe, by itself, or Europe collectively, has the strength to be the peacemaker in the world.

So it is all right here. It is in America. It is in that Oval Office, whoever is there, and it is there for the forseeable future. In other words, the United States must maintain its strength in order to play a role between the great powers of the world and among the great powers of the world of reducing the danger of war, because our ideals and our goals -- subject as they can be to much criticism as far as tactics are concerned in the world scene -- our ideals and our goals are for a world of peace. Our ideals and our goals are for a world in which we reduce the burden of arms, and therefore, it is vitally important that this nation that has that kind of ideals and that kind of goals maintains its strength so that we can play that role.

But maintaining the strength alone is not enough. It must be respected. And that means that we must continue to have a policy which commands respect throughout the world. We must continue to insist on adherence to agreements that are made. We must continue to let the world know that while we have no aggressive intentions any place in the world, we will stand by our treaty commitments wherever they are in the world.

That, you see, is the language of peace rather than the language of bugging out of the world and turning to what people wistfully might think to be a fortress America. . . .

WILLIAM COLBY RESPONDS

During the Congressional investigations of the CIA in 1974, the Director of Central Intelligence, William Colby, appeared on the cover of *Time*, and was interviewed by the magazine. Most directors of Central Intelligence had kept low profiles and avoided media attention. The revelations of the Church Committee, however, brought intense scrutiny to the CIA, and Colby felt that the agency had to stand up and answer the questions. Strobe Talbott of *Time* interviewed Colby and received some candid replies to questions about the CIA's role in foreign policy.

Colby was quite clear in his opinions about covert action. Have students use this interview as a guide to create their own set of questions about covert action. Have them use these questions to write to elected officials about their views on covert action.

DIRECTOR COLBY ON THE RECORD

Time (September 30, 1974)

In a rare on-the-record interview with *Time* Correspondent Strobe Talbott, Director William Colby defended the CIA against its critics, ranged over the current functions of the agency, and discussed future prospects. Highlights:

Why does the CIA intervene in other nations' internal affairs?

I'm not saying we're engaged in a campaign to bring democracy to the world. That's not what the U.S. Government expects from this agency. We're expected to carry out U.S. policy. Over the years, we've helped democratic forces rather broadly. In those cases where we have got involved with military regimes, we did so because there was a greater danger from some place else. I don't think we've toppled democratic regimes, and I don't think we did so in Chile. First, we didn't bring about the coup, and second, the Allende regime was not democratic. Granted the military regime is not democratic, I don't think a Communist regime is democratic.

Our program in Chile was to sustain the democratic forces against the Allende political forces, which were suppressing various democratic elements in a variety of ways — harrassing radio stations, harrassing some parts of the press and some political groups. We looked forward to the democratic forces coming to power in the elections of 1976.

To what extent had Communist forces intervened in Chile?

Castro spent about a month down there in the late spring of 1973. There were a lot of extremist exiles in Chile from other countries in Latin America. There was a lot of assistance going into Chile from Cuba and other Communist sources. There are indications that there was some Soviet activity. They were putting some money in, as well as hardware of various sorts. This was a program to support an eventual takeover in what I would call a non-democratic fashion — suppressing the opposition and extending Communist influence elsewhere in the hemisphere.

Will the CIA continue to mount covert operations?

The CIA has three major functions: science and technological work, analysis, and the clandestine collection of intelligence. Now there's been a fourth responsibility, and that is positively influencing a situation through political or paramilitary means. That's the one that goes up and down depending on national policy. Right now it's way down.

The degree of our involvement in covert activities reflects the kind of world we live in. If it's a world where two superpowers are peering over the fence at each other, then it's a matter of concern when a hostile political group is about to take over a country. But if it's a world in which we've worked out a relationship of reasonable restraint, or détente, with the other superpowers, then it won't matter to us who runs one of these countries in a far-flung area. Of course, something very close to us might still be important for political or security reasons. There may still be certain situations where U.S. interests — and I don't mean corporate interests, but fundamental political interests — can be adversely affected. In some of those cases it would be appropriate to take some modest action such as establishing a rela-

tionship with somebody who needs the help. But I stress: it's not now our Government's policy to engage in these situations around the world.

How is a covert operation started?

We follow the traffic with the embassy. We follow the political attitudes that we have toward that country. We generate a specific suggestion in the light of what we think would be national policy. We don't do anything without approval.

Sometimes we get the specific suggestion from the outside — from an ambassador, from the State Department or from the National Security Council staff. They'll say: "Why don't you guys do so and so?" We have the technicians here who decide what is possible and what is not. It's the same sort of thing you get with military activity. How you land troops on a hostile shore is not developed in the White House. The Joint Chiefs develop a proposal. Then if the White House approves it, you go ahead.

But I want to emphasize that we're talking about a very small number of covert actions. Policy is generated at the NSC, not here.

What would you regard as a successful covert action?

Laos. It was considered important to the U.S. that a country remain friendly and not be taken over by hostile forces. Rather than use our military force or an enormous political effort, you try to influence some key people and key political groups. The Laos operation cost substantial amounts but was cheap compared with other ways of doing business. We were not involved in the 1967 coup in Greece or in the coup in Chile last year.

Should the operational side of the CIA be separated from intelligence gathering?

That proposal stems from the Bay of Pigs. The problem there was that we didn't let the analysts in on the act. Now senior levels of the analyst community are aware of covert activities and have a chance to comment. In the early years of the agency, we tried conducting intelligence and action operations through two separate units, but they kept getting in each other's way.

What alternatives to covert operations are possible for the CIA?

We could not — and did not — conduct the SALT negotiations and reach a SALT agreement until after our intelligence techniques had improved to the degree that we could tell whether the Soviets were going to abide by the agreements. On a number of occasions, we have identified a situation that was getting very sour in some country or between two countries. By reporting the facts and our assessment, we generated diplomatic action so that the trouble we predicted did not happen. For instance, peace arrangements might have broken down, but because of our intelligence, negotiations saved the situation.

In the future this sort of intelligence will help our country in negotiations and diplomatic relationships. As a result, we will be less likely to get into screaming crises, and there will be less need for covert action. It will be the increasing responsibility of the CIA to give our leaders the knowledge necessary to move into a dire situation and defuse it.

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The Limits of Covert Action

THE LIMITS OF COVERT ACTION

This section offers a long excerpt from one of the panels at the Tufts University symposium on covert action. This panel addressed the limits of covert action, with the speakers presenting varying conclusions. William Colby, the former director of Central Intelligence, argued that covert action is necessary, and he presented some principles which he felt should guide its use. Morton Halperin, the director of the American Civil Liberties Union and the director of the Center for National Security Studies, discussed why he is opposed to covert action projects. Franklin Lindsay, a former OSS and CIA officer, provided some recommendations to prevent the abuse of the system.

These remarks will highlight many of the issues already raised in this guide. Teachers might outline with students the positions taken by each of the speakers in this excerpt, and use this outline to initiate the review of the work the class has done on this subject.

SHOULD WE ABOLISH COVERT OPERATIONS?

William Colby, Morton Halperin, Franklin Lindsay

Tufts University symposium panel (excerpt)

William Colby: Part of the question before us is whether we should have covert action. We have a recent rather authoritative determination on that. It's written by the majority of the Iran/Contra Committee that investigated this. Not the Republican Minority. One of its conclusions: "Covert operations are a necessary component of our nation's foreign policy." Another phrase: "Covert operations are compatible with democratic government if they are conducted in an accountable manner and in accordance with law." Now that's a pretty ringing affirmation of the fact that our country needs and will continue to conduct covert action. The question is, under what standards? What limits should exist on covert action? This is a problem that the ethical philosophers and theologians have wrestled with over the centuries with respect to violence between nations and between people. And they've come out with a few rather simple, overall principles which are subsumed under the title of the "just war" as distinct from the unjust war. There are a lot of various elements to it, but the two principle ones that I'd like to draw to your attention are: first . . . that a war is just if it's for one's defense. It is unjust if it is aggressive against your neighbor. . . .

The second major principle of the just war is that the means used be proportionate to the end being sought, to the just end being sought. What that boils down to in simple terms is that one should not drop a nuclear weapon on some village from which one had three shots from a rifle. One is entitled to react to those three shots from a rifle . . . but one is not entitled to use a disproportionate degree of force. Now I think that relates in a way to covert actions. Because in many respects some quiet assistance to some friends in a neighboring area which is threatening can perhaps eliminate a problem at considerably less cost both to us and to the other party, by covert action rather than by regular military force. Now this again is debatable. But I think it's a principle that's well established over the centuries: proportionality. I think there's another limit . . . which is the necessity to follow American law. You notice I say American law. And that's exactly what the committee said: American law. . . .

Morton Halperin: Now, Mr. Colby said that the question of whether we should abolish covert operations has been settled, and suggested that we get on to the issue of what limits to put on them. I would remind him, if he was still here, of what George Schultz said at the Iran/Contra hearing. He said, correctly, that nothing in Washington is ever finally settled. And I would suggest to you that the issue of abolishing covert operations is not only not settled, but I believe we are just beginning the debate on that question. . . . The Iran/Contra affair provides in my view a very clear lesson, a lesson that should have been drawn in the mid-70s, and which now needs to be drawn: there is simply an incompatibility between covert operations and our form of a democratic society that requires that we abolish covert operations. I agree we don't yet have the votes in Congress. I suspect we may not even have one vote in

the Senate, but I am optimistic about the political process to believe that we will get there. Let me try to suggest to you briefly why I think we need to get to that point. I want to do that by revealing to you the most important secret that there is about covert operations . . . virtually every covert operation in fact does not have to be kept secret. Now if you think about it for a minute, in almost every case, the people to whom we are doing the covert operation know that we are doing it. To take the most obvious example, . . . the Iranians knew that we were selling arms to them. . . . The Cambodians knew that we were bombing them. The Nicaraguans knew that we were trying to overthrow their government. Mr. Castro not only knew but publically announced time and again that we were trying to assassinate him. Covert operations are not secret from those to whom we direct them. It is also the case that when covert operations become public, they are not stopped. . . . Take for example aid to rebels in Afghanistan. It became public and far from stopping the operation, it accelerated it. Because once we were able to talk about it publically, the broad support in the United States for the Afghan rebels in fact forced the administration to accelerate the program. It has gone forward. There are details that are secret . . . but we have a public debate in this country about whether to aid the Afghan rebels. The fact that covert operation became an overt covert operation did not require it to stop. Finally I would argue that when there is secrecy, the secrecy is aimed at one audience and one audience only, namely, the Congress and the American public. MacFarlane in his testimony before the Iran/Contra Committee essentially said this. He talked about the decision of the Reagan Administration to try to overthrow the government of Nicaragua. And he said we had two choices. One choice was to publically announce this policy, to do what President Johnson did in the case of Vietnam. To do what President Truman did in the case of Greece and Turkey, which is to go the Congress and . . . ask authority to [overthrow the government of Nicaragua] and then procede. The alternative is what we did, which is to start a covert operation. And what McFarlane said is that from a foreign policy point of view, it was far better to do the former. . . . That operation, our ability to see it through to a successful conclusion, would have been much more credible if we had gone first and had a public debate and a public resolution. And McFarlane explained . . . that . . . the President did not do that [because] he knew that if he did it, he would not have the votes. He knew that the American people and the American Congress would not have supported an effort to overthrow the Sandinista government, and so he began a covert operation and as with all covert operations, once you begin one which is controversial which would not have public support, you inevitably lie to the American people about what is going on. We saw that in Iran/Contra. We saw that in Nicaragua. We saw that in all of the previous controversial covert operations, and you go from lying to breaking the law. And those two things corrode the democratic process, because when government officials come to believe that it is necessary to lie to the Congress, when it is necessary to lie to the public, that carries over from the covert operation to other activities, because you cannot have respect for people who you believe you have the right to lie to. It breaks down the sense of shared responsibility, and produces disrespect and disdain for the democratic process, for the Congress, and for the rest of the executive branch to which you lie.

Lying and the belief that you . . . are entitled to break the law inevitably occur if one seeks to engage in covert operations. . . .

Franklin Lindsay: First of all, covert operations must be consistent with and support openly announced policies and objectives which have been established by normal processes of government. We get in trouble when a policy is inconsistent with what is openly stated as American policy. In terms of secrecy, we may be able to maintain secrecy for a short period of time, but inevitably . . . practically everything that has been done as a covert operation is sooner or later going to be known. If it is consistent with what has been our overt policy, we can say, "Of course we did that, and we had a good reason." If it seems completely contrary to what we have been saying in public, the United States suffers from that. . . . At best covert operations can provide tactical support for long-term national policies openly arrived at and openly executed. They are no substitute for overt operations. . . . Most importantly, covert operations must not be used as a convenient escape from public review, nor to circumvent overt procedures for policy approval where it is possible to accomplish the objective by overt means.

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CONCLUDING ACTIVITIES AND CLOSING QUESTIONS

Review again with students the structure of the government of the United States. Where do covert activities fit in this structure?

Also review with students some of the introductory questions about secrecy, rights, and responsibility that are posed in the beginning sections of this guide. Do they now think differently about these questions?

Raise again the question of skepticism about the government. Should we be skeptical? Should we keep an eye on our government? How can we best do that? Can citizens participate in the issue of covert action? How?

You may want to conclude this study of covert action by having the class respond to a hypothetical situation. Tell the class that a crisis appears to be brewing in a small, poor, developing nation. Some intelligence reports claim that a revolutionary group with Marxist sympathies are waiting for the right moment to seize power, to take over a crisis-ridden government that has been friendly to the United States. This friendly government appeals to the United States for help. A paramilitary intervention may not be necessary. A strong propaganda campaign or financial contributions to the right people might help. Would a covert action be desirable? What would you need to know in order to decide?

Finally, you might ask students to draft a law to define and describe the role of covert action within the American system. If you were the President, what would you want in this law? If you were a member of Congress, what would you want? If you were part of the CIA, what would you want? As a citizen of the United States, what do you want?

TIMELINE

1941	United States enters World War II.
1942	Office of Strategic Services (OSS) set up.
1944	November — Franklin D. Roosevelt elected to fourth term, Harry Truman Vice-President.
1945	April — Roosevelt dies. Truman becomes President. June — United Nations set up. August — A-bombs dropped on Japan. September — Japan surrenders, ending World War II. October — OSS disbanded.
1946	March — Churchill's "Iron Curtain" speech.
1947	March — Truman Doctrine announced. June — Marshall Plan announced. December — Covert operations assigned to CIA at first meeting of National Security Council.
1948	April — CIA plays role in Italian elections. June — Berlin blockaded by USSR. Lasts until May 1949. National Security Council sets up office of policy coordination.
1949	April — NATO set up. USSR tests A-Bomb. September — CIA drops agents behind Iron Curtain, continued unsuccessfully through 1952. December — Mao takes over China.
1950	June — Korean War begins.
1953	January — Eisenhower inaugurated as President. July — Armistice in Korea. August — Operation Ajax returns Shah to power in Iran.
1954	June — Operation Success topples Arbenz in Guatemala. July — Geneva Conference temporarily divides Vietnam. United States sends missions into North Vietnam. September — SEATO set up.
1955	May — Warsaw Pact signed.
1956	October — USSR intervenes in Poland and Hungary. Suez crisis in Middle East. November — Eisenhower reelected.
1957	October — Sputnik launched.
1958	Covert operations by United States fail in Indonesia.
1959	January — Castro comes to power in Cuba.

1960	May — U-2 spy plane shot down over USSR. June — Civil war in the Congo. August — Planning for the Bay of Pigs invasion begins. Fall — American agents involved in assassination plot against Patrice Lamumba of the Congo.
1961	January — John F. Kennedy inaugurated as President. March — Peace Corps set up. April — Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba failed. August — Berlin Wall built. Operation Mongoose begins against Castro following Bay of Pigs failure (ongoing to 1965).
1962	October — Cuban Missile Crisis.
1963	November — President Diem of South Vietnam overthrown and killed. President Kennedy assassinated. Lyndon Johnson sworn in as President.
1964	August — Tonkin Gulf incident widens American role in Vietnam. October — China explodes nuclear bomb. United States involved in political action and propaganda in Chilean election. November — President Johnson elected to office.
1965	March — American ground troops land in South Vietnam.
1966	Phoenix program gets underway in South Vietnam.
1967	June — 6 Day War in the Middle East.
1968	January — North Korea seizes U.S.S. Pueblo. Tet Offensive launched by North Vietnam. April — Martin Luther King, Jr. assassinated. June — Robert F. Kennedy assassinated. August — Russian troops sent into Czechoslovakia.
1969	January — Nixon inaugurated as President. March — Operation Menu: Secret bombing of Cambodia. June — First American troops withdrawn from Vietnam. White House prepares Operation Chaos.
1970	March — Prince Sihanouk deposed in Cambodia. April — Cambodian incursion by American troops. September — Salvador Allende elected president of Chile. United States begins Track II operations against Allende.
1971	June — *New York Times* and others publish *Pentagon Papers*.
1972	February — Nixon visits China. March — Easter Offensive launched by North Vietnam. June — Break-in at Democratic National Committee headquarters at the Watergate Hotel. August — Last American ground troops leave South Vietnam.

November — Richard Nixon reelected
December — United States launches Christmas Bombing of North Vietnam

1973 January — Paris Peace Treaty signed
August — American bombing of Southeast Asia ends
September — Allende overthrown and killed
October — Yom Kippur War in the Middle East

1974 August — Nixon resigns. Gerald Ford sworn in as new President
Hughes-Ryan amendment passed

1975 January — Church Committee set up to study intelligence operations
April — Khmer Rouge overthrows Lon Nol in Cambodia. North Vietnam conquers South Vietnam
Operation Feature — Covert operations in Angola begin

1976 January — Ford bans all future covert assassination programs

1977 January — Jimmy Carter inaugurated as President
Panama Canal treaties signed

1979 January — Shah forced out of Iran
Full diplomatic relations begin between United States and China
March — Camp David Accords
November — 66 Americans taken hostage in Iran
December — USSR sends troops into Afghanistan

1980 September — Iran-Iraq War begins
Intelligence Oversight Act passed

1981 January — Ronald Reagan inaugurated as President
Hostages in Iran released after 444 days
December — President Ronald Reagan signs a "finding" authorizing covert operations to support the anti-Sandinista rebels, or Contras
Executive Order 12333 gives National Security Council a role in intelligence gathering and renews assassination ban

1982 December — Amendment proposed by Representative Edward Boland becomes law, prohibiting any use of Federal funds to overthrow the Government of Nicaragua

1983 October — 241 American Marines killed by bomb in Lebanon
Operation Urgent Fury — United States invades Grenada

1984 March — Mining of Nicaraguan harbors by United States revealed
July — Saudia Arabia secretly agrees to help fund Contras
October — The second Boland Amendment becomes law, banning any agency or entity involved in intelligence activities from aiding the Contras
CIA Terrorist Guide revealed

1985 June — United States provides money to Iran as part of hostage deal
November — United States provides missiles to Iran as part of hostage deal

1986

January — Reagan signs finding on arms for hostages deal. Finding not sent to Congressional committees.
February — Link made between arms sales to Iran and funding for Contras.
April — United States bombs Libya.
June — Congress votes aid for Contras.
August — North meets with the House Intelligence Committee and denies raising money for or offering military advice to the Contras.
November — A Lebanese magazine, *Al-Shiraa*, reveals the U.S. arms shipment to Iran and McFarlane's visit to Tehran.
Jan. 1986 finding on Iranian arms deal finally sent to Intelligence Committees.
Meese announces the diversion of money from the Iran arms sales to the Contras. Reagan announces Poindexter's resignation and North's dismissal.

1987

February — The Tower Commission, headed by former Texas Senator John Tower, issues its report. It concludes that the President's advisers were responsible for the Iran-Contra Affair, and that Reagan was out of touch with the operations undertaken by the NSC.
May — Iran-Contra Hearings begin. Director of CIA, William Casey dies.

1989

January — Bush inaugurated as President.
October — American role in attempted coup in Panama revealed. Repeal of Assassination Ban discussed.

SUGGESTED GRADE LEVELS FOR READINGS IN SECRECY AND DEMOCRACY

Reading	Grade
Provisions of the Freedom of Information Act	10 and up
Memo from North	11 and up
Presidential Finding	11 and up
Memo from Poindexter	11 and up
Covert Action in a Democratic Society	11 and up
Officials Assert U.S. Trying to Weaken Costa Rica Chief	9 and up
Speech on the Fourteen Points	10 and up
Central Intelligence Agency	10 and up
National Security Council Memorandum #68	9 and up
The People Take Over	9 and up
The Struggle for the Control of Iran	9 and up
The United States and Mossadegh	9 and up
Exit the Colonel, Complaining	9 and up
Doolittle Report	9 and up
John F. Kennedy Inaugural Address	9 and up
Anti-Castro Units Trained to Fight at Florida Bases	9 and up
The Phoenix Program	9 and up
United States Assistance Programs in Vietnam	9 and up
Plausible Deniability	9 and up
The President's Initial Instruction and Background	9 and up
Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders	10 and up
Report to the President by the Commission on CIA Activities	10 and up
Hughes-Ryan Amendment	9 and up
Richard Nixon Responds	9 and up
Director Colby on the Record	9 and up
Should We Abolish Covert Operations?	9 and up

GLOSSARY

Air America A CIA subsidiary airline set up in Southeast Asia.

Bay of Pigs Invasion April 1961 attempt by anti-Castro rebels, known as Brigade 2506, supported covertly by the United States, to overthrow the Cuban government.

Church Committee Formally, the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence. Established in 1975 under Senator Frank Church, Democrat from Idaho.

CIA Central Intelligence Agency. Set up by the National Security Act of 1947.

Civil Air Transport A CIA subsidiary airline set up in Southeast Asia.

Clandestine Secret.

Containment American cold war strategy which sought to limit Communism to those states where it already existed.

Contras Armed opponents of the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. Known to some as "freedom fighters."

Counterinsurgency Forces Small groups of soldiers who would use the techniques of guerrilla warfare to fight guerrila forces.

Counterintelligence Process by which government secrets are safeguarded.

Covert Operations Secret operations carried out in pursuance of national policy in such a way that the hand of the government can not be seen.

Denied Areas Cold War designation for states which had fallen under the control of the Soviet Union.

Findings Presidential report to Congress outlining CIA operations.

Free World Cold War designation for states allied with the United States.

Hmong Southeast Asian peoples recruited by United States in wars in that region of the world.

Hughes-Ryan Amendment 1974 addition to the Foreign Assistance Act which set up the procedure by which the President would report to the Congress on covert operations. Set up the concept of "findings."

National Security The safety of the nation.

NSC 68 A memorandum written by the National Security Council for President Truman. It provided an analysis of the world scene which influenced American policymakers for decades.

Office of Policy Coordination Office within the CIA which became the home for covert action.

Office of Strategic Services World War II intelligence agency which was the forerunner of the CIA. Run by Col. William Donovan.

Operation Ajax American covert action against Mossadegh in Iran in 1953. Restored the Shah to power.

Operation Chaos Covert operation carried on by the American government against American citizens who opposed government policy.

Operation Menu American covert action begun in 1969 which resulted in the secret bombing of Cambodia.

Operation Monjoose American covert actions against Castro and his government in the early 1960s.

Operation Success American covert action which toppled President Arbenz of Guatemala in 1954.

Pathet Lao Communist forces in Laos.

Phoenix Program American covert action campaign in South Vietnam which aimed to destroy the infrastructure of the Vietcong.

Plausible Deniability The principle that a covert operation should not be able to be traced back to its source. Government officials must always be able to convince others that the President was not involved in such a campaign.

Political Action Changing the political balance in a country, often using financial means.

Propaganda Literally, the doctrines or principles of a movement or organization. Used by the CIA as a shorthand for campaigns in which foreign journalists are paid to write articles from a certain vantage point.

Roll Back American Cold War theory, held strongly by conservatives, which sought the displacement of Communism from areas it had conquered.

Track II Covert operations carried out by the United States in Chile to discredit Allende and his government.

Vietcong Term used by President Diem of South Vietnam to designate his enemies. Literally, Vietnamese Communists. Used widely during the Vietnam War.

Vietnamization President Nixon's strategy for ending the war in Vietnam. It included building up the South Vietnamese military, increasing the bombing of the enemy, and withdrawing American soldiers.

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SECRECY AND DEMOCRACY

Is covert action constitutional? Does it violate our system of checks and balances? Does it destroy our position of moral leadership in the world? Does it threaten democracy?

These are among the questions raised in this curriculum. We will look at the ways in which covert action has been used throughout the history of the United States, emphasizing the period since World War II. This curriculum will challenge students to look at our existing government and to compare it with the structure outlined in the Constitution.

This curriculum will also explore ways in which we get our information about the government, and it will examine far-reaching questions about the nature of secrecy, democracy, and power. Several different historical episodes will be presented—after an examination of the recent events of Iran-Contra, the guide will discuss the origins of covert action after WWII, involvements in the 1950s and 1960s in Iran, Guatemala, and Cuba, and covert actions during the Nixon and Reagan eras. Students will gain an understanding of the important role covert action has played in American foreign policy since World War II, and students will be challenged to think about the ramifications of the secret methods often used to carry out the national interest.

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